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Abstract
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In recent years, there has been an increasing recognition 
that significant welfare gains could be realized through 
deep forms of regional integration which entail 
harmonization of legal, regulatory and institutional 
frameworks. Reforms that reduce cross-border transaction 
costs and improve the performance of “backbone” 
infrastructure services are arguably even more important 
for the creation of an open, unified regional economic 
space than trade policy reforms narrowly defined. This 
paper assesses the potential gains from regionalized 
telecommunications policy in West Africa. To this end, 
This paper—a product of the Environment and Energy Team, Development Research Group—is part of a larger effort 
in the department to improve regulatory effectiveness through regionalization. Policy Research Working Papers are also 
posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at Ikessides@worldbank.org.  
the paper: (i) discusses how regional cooperation can 
overcome national limits in technical expertise, enhance 
the capacity of nations credibly to commit to stable 
regulatory policy, and ultimately facilitate infrastructure 
investment in the region; (ii) identifies trade-distorting 
regulations that inhibit opportunities for regional trade 
and economic development, and so are good candidates 
for regional trade negotiations to reduce indirect trade 
barriers; and (iii) describes substantive elements of a 
harmonized regional regulatory policy that can deliver 
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I. Introduction 
 
Until fairly recently, most nations dealt with telecommunications policy as a 
domestic concern to be managed by a ministry of post and communications and, among 
nations with private operators, an independent regulator.  International organizations 
were involved in telecommunications policy mainly to facilitate agreements about 
telecommunications traffic among nations.  But trade liberalization and rapid 
technological progress, especially in mobile wireless technology, have made greater 
coordination and harmonization of telecommunications policy more attractive.   
Moreover, smaller, less wealthy nations, especially in Africa, are interested in 
regionalization as a means to pool regulatory resources. 
In creating the West African Telecommunications Regulators Assembly 
(WATRA), West African nations and their regional trade organization, the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS), are among the leaders in attempting to 
regionalize telecommunications policy.  ECOWAS and WATRA have pursued regional 
harmonization of telecommunications regulation within the framework of a market-
based, largely privatized sector. 
This report assesses the potential gains from regionalized telecommunications 
policy in West Africa.  The report seeks to assist officials in ECOWAS, WATRA and 
member states in designing an effective regional regulatory process.  To this end, the 
report:  (i) discusses how regional cooperation can overcome national limits in technical 
expertise, enhance the capacity of nations credibly to commit to stable regulatory policy, 
and ultimately facilitate infrastructure investment in the region;  (ii) identifies trade-
distorting regulations that inhibit opportunities for regional trade and economic 
development, and so are good candidates for regional trade negotiations to reduce 
indirect trade barriers;  and (iii) describes substantive elements of a harmonized regional 
regulatory policy that can deliver immediate performance benefits. 
    3
II. Preliminary  Observations 
 
In most countries, the impetus for reform of telecommunications policy arose 
from the poor performance of domestic incumbent operators (in nearly all cases state-
owned enterprises within a Ministry of Telecommunications), and focused mainly on 
redefining the roles of the public and private sectors in telecommunications for the 
purpose of expanding service and improving its quality.  For similar reasons, other 
important infrastructure industries, such as electricity, transportation and water, also 
attracted the attention of reformers. 
Despite their origins in domestic concerns, infrastructure reforms also can have a 
substantial effect on production costs in trade-related, infrastructure-intensive industries.  
Consequently, infrastructure reform has become an important component of international 
economic policy.
2  The internationalization of reforms of infrastructure sectors occurred 
for three reasons. 
First, as trade liberalization reduced the role of tariffs and quotas in affecting the 
ability of a firm to compete in foreign markets, inefficiencies in infrastructure industries 
became more likely to determine the international competitiveness of domestic industries.  
Specifically, inefficient domestic infrastructure can cause otherwise efficient national 
firms to lose both domestic and international market share to firms from countries with 
better infrastructure. 
Second, domestic infrastructure policies can create substantial indirect trade 
barriers.  For example, a highly inefficient transportation system can effectively protect 
inefficient domestic firms from competition from superior foreign suppliers by increasing 
the advantage of close proximity between buyers and sellers.       
Third, both economic integration and technological progress have caused the 
natural market areas of infrastructure industries to expand, frequently transcending 
national borders.  Electricity, telecommunications, and transportation operate more 
efficiently if their networks are organized according to the patterns of transactions, and 
trade liberalization has made these patterns increasingly international.  Moreover, 
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adjacent networks frequently can minimize costs by sharing capacities to take advantage 
of differences in the time-patterns of usage of infrastructure services during the day and 
year.  Thus, regulation in these sectors rarely has purely domestic effects, and when it 
does, the reason often is that nations within a region are taking advantage of opportunities 
for integrating their networks. 
Although infrastructure reform programs differ among nations, most are based on 
creating market institutions and some degree of competition.  The purpose of these 
reforms is to generate more powerful financial incentives for infrastructure suppliers to 
improve the performance of these industries.  The reforms have three common elements:  
(1) corporatizing and usually privatizing incumbent ministerial operators;  (2) permitting 
and even encouraging competition in markets that had been protected monopolies;  and 
(3) creating a regulatory body that is independent from the incumbent operator. 
Internationalization of at least some elements of reform is attractive because it 
contributes to the efficiency goals of policy reform while sidestepping some of the 
political obstacles to effective reform.  Infrastructure reform, when implemented in each 
nation independently, can become bogged down in a quest for national advantage that 
undermines development for everyone.  An obvious example in telecommunications 
policy is termination charges for international calls, in which many nations – including 
those in West Africa – set exorbitant rates for the purposes of implicitly taxing foreigners 
to pay for part of the domestic network.  Of course, if all nations follow the policy, the 
primary effect is to suppress international communications, along with opportunities for 
further economic integration that require inexpensive communications.  Similarly, 
infrastructure operators that are established in one nation are strong candidates for 
competitive entry in adjacent nations, especially in circumstances where national 
boundaries reflect historical divisions of colonial authority rather than natural ethnic and 
economic communities.  Yet in the same quest for national advantage, each state is prone 
to favor fledgling domestic operators rather then established foreign operators who are 
capable of creating an integrated regional communications system.  National 
balkanization of the industry, especially among smaller states, further reduces the 
effectiveness of reform.  When markets naturally cross national boundaries, a regional    5
regulatory agreement for mutual recognition of operators facilitates the development of a 
seamless and competitive network. 
Internationalization of regulatory policy also has important political benefits.   
Within a single nation, infrastructure reform, especially when debated one issue at a time, 
is often blocked by well-organized interest groups.  But if reform becomes part of a 
broader international policy that covers a range of issues, all stakeholders will likely 
participate—making it more difficult for a single group to block it.  Moreover, once the 
standard reform package is adopted, the credibility of the newly created regulator often is 
undermined by political interference on behalf of favored interests.  Political interference 
is more difficult and costly when regulatory policy is part of an international agreement, 
or when the regulatory body is a multinational agency.  In addition, regional cooperation 
may generate sufficiently large economic benefits that each nation regards deviation from 
negotiated agreements as too costly.  Thus, multilateral regulatory agreements can 
accelerate domestic reform, enhance the stability and credibility of the reform process, 
and help countries attract much greater private investment. 
Small or poor nations that lack formal institutions and technical expertise have 
still another reason to internationalize regulatory reform. A pragmatic response to limited 
national regulatory capacity is to increase policy and regulatory coordination and 
cooperation—and ultimately to create regional (multinational) regulatory authorities.   
These bodies also can be an effective means for disseminating information and expertise 
from countries that are further along the reform path to nations that are just beginning 
their reform process. 
Regional regulatory cooperation and the eventual creation of a regional regulatory 
authority are more feasible among groups of countries that have already made progress 
on regional economic integration.  ECOWAS was created on the basis of the belief that 
regional cooperation can accelerate the economic development of the region.  To that 
end, the community has made steady progress towards the development of a common 
market.  ECOWAS, through the West African Monetary Agency (WAMA), has 
implemented the regional payments system to facilitate regional trade and has made 
progress in the long process of creating a common regional currency.  ECOWAS also has 
facilitated several multi-country infrastructure projects that are designed to promote    6
economic integration.  Within this framework, regulatory harmonization, the elimination 
of trade-distorting national regulations, and cooperation to overcome domestic constraints 
on regulatory capacity are important contributors to the economic integration, sustained 
economic growth, and international competitiveness of the region. 
Obtaining consensus from all governments in a region for a regional regulator is 
not easy, due to different attitudes, approaches and commitments to reform, as well as 
concerns about national sovereignty. Effective international regulatory policy requires 
considerable cooperation and trust between countries, which can be built through an 
assembly of regulators such as WATRA.  As a first step, WATRA facilitates information 
exchange, offers non-binding advice on procedural issues (such as dispute resolution), 
and makes substantive recommendations on policy matters (such as standardization, 
interconnection, and methods for estimating costs and setting prices).  Consensus for a 
regional regulatory body could increase as more countries reform, and the gains from 
regional policy coordination and trade become more apparent. 
    7
III. ECOWAS—Historical  Background 
 
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was founded on 
May 28, 1975, when sixteen Anglophone, Lusophone and Francophone countries signed 
the Treaty of Lagos.  ECOWAS is comprised of 15 countries which include: Benin, 
Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, 
Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo (figure 1).
3  The primary 
objective of ECOWAS is to promote regional co-operation and integration, and to create 
a unified economic space in order to facilitate economic growth and development in West 
Africa.  The preamble to the 1975 ECOWAS Treaty notes that the community was 
created because of the “…overriding need to accelerate, foster and encourage the 
economic and social development of member states in order to improve the living 
standards of their peoples.”
4  ECOWAS saw regional integration as a multistage process 
leading to a customs union and ultimately to the establishment of an economic and 
monetary union that would raise the living standards of its people and enhance economic 
stability in the region.
5  The key elements of ECOWAS’ policy have been to eliminate all 
tariffs and other trade barriers between the member states and to establish a customs 
union, a unified fiscal policy, a common currency and coordinated regional policies in the 
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Figure 1  Economic Community of West African States 
 
 
ECOWAS exists alongside other sub-regional integration arrangements and inter-
governmental organizations (Table 1).  The Communaute des Etats de l’Afrique de 
l’Ouest (CEAO) led the scene in 1973 with the establishment of a joint central bank, the 
BCEAO.  The now dormant Mano River Union (MRU) was established also in 1973.  
Another community in the same region is the West African Economic and Monetary 
Union (UEMOA).  UEMOA was created in 1994 by the Francophone States of West 
Africa, all members of the CFA zone.  The UEMOA countries share a single currency 
and monetary policy.  As of 2000 intra-UEMOA tariffs were lifted and common external 
tariffs were applied to all imports.  In recent years, and with the support of France, 
UEMOA has intensified its efforts to achieve policy coordination among its member 
states.  These efforts culminated in the creation of a common Francophone West African 
Stock Exchange in Abidjan.  The Francophone countries have also tried to streamline 
their commercial law, within the treaty of the Organization for the Harmonization of    9
African Business Law (OHADA).  Performance among UEMOA countries seems to be at 
a respectable level compared to the rest of the West African countries.
7  
The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria and Sierra Leone, formed another 
community within the ECOWAS region, the West Africa Monetary Zone (WAMZ).   
These countries intend to form a monetary union, using the ECO as their common 
currency.  The launching of the union was postponed from 2005 to 2009, due to these 
countries’ difficulties in meeting the primary convergence criteria.  
 
Table 1  Membership of Regional Integration Arrangements in West Africa 
 
Source: Aryeetey (2001). 
 
The multiplicity of parallel and sometimes competing activities under the 
umbrella of different inter-governmental organizations within the West African Region 
has often hampered the progress of ECOWAS.  Another often-cited problem seems to be 
the division into Francophone and Anglophone zones.   
Since its creation, ECOWAS has signed a number of agreements on, among other 
things, free movement of people goods, transport facilitation, monetary integration, and 
air-transport liberalization.  Although many of these agreements have never been fully 
implemented, ECOWAS has had a number of achievements such as:  the resolution of 
political and social conflicts among some of its member states, the introduction of the 
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ECOWAS travel certificate for member states, the establishment of the Brown Card 
insurance scheme, the creation of the West African Unit of Account to facilitate 
international payments within the region, and the elimination of some tariffs. 
 
Trade Liberalization 
Trade facilitation has been one of the main objectives of ECOWAS since its 
establishment.  Early attempts at trade liberalization were hampered by the unwillingness 
of many countries to implement the provisions of the ECOWAS treaties relating to tariff 
and non-tariff barriers.
8 Thus, the difficulty of implementing the treaties of the 
community Treaties is the most often-cited obstacle to integration.  This is partly due to 
the very limited statutory powers of ECOWAS to force governments to implement the 
trade liberalization directives and agreements.  Other problems include the: relatively low 
levels of intra-regional trade (during 1994-2000 the share of intra-community trade was 
19.8% for exports and 20.9% for imports);
9 overlapping integration arrangements with 
many countries belonging to more than one regional community; lack of political 
commitment; and the inadequacy of compensation mechanisms.  In addition, trade has 
been impeded by corruption on the borders and inadequate transport infrastructure.
10  
Recently ECOWAS has paid considerable attention to trade integration and has 
set up a “Roadmap to the ECOWAS Customs Union.”  This roadmap includes six broad 
categories of action that include the creation of a free trade area, a Common External 
Tariff (CET), and the harmonization of customs legislation and regulation.  With the help 
of the USAID and the ECOTRADE project, ECOWAS has expanded the UEMOA’s 
CET throughout the region.  In May 2005, ECOWAS adopted the plan to implement a 
common external tariff that will come into force in December 2007.  The planned CET 
encompasses four tariff bands (20%, 10%, 5%, 0%).  The newly created ECOWAS CET 
Management Committee has the oversight responsibility for the CET.
11   
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ECOWAS-EU Negotiations 
The adoption of a common external tariff was a prerequisite for the ECOWAS – 
EU negotiations on the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA).  EPAs are trade and 
development agreements that the European Union is negotiating with the African, 
Caribbean and Pacific Group (ACP).  EPAs will replace the trade chapters of the 2000 
Cotonou Agreement between the EU and the ACP countries.  The exemption of these 
chapters from the WTO law expires in 2008, requiring both parties to reach a WTO-
compatible agreement by then. 
The EPA negotiations were launched in Brussels in September 2002 and were 
followed by a second phase of negotiations between the EU and the ACP regional 
communities.  The first two regions that entered into the second phase of negotiations 
were West and Central Africa.  ECOWAS (+Mauritania) launched the second phase of 
negotiations in October 2003.  Since the launching of the second phase, there have been 
discussions on customs issues, a free trade area, EU import standards and the trade of 
services.  Five technical working groups were set up to discuss the main issues to be 
covered by the EPA and its impact on the competitiveness of the different sectors.
12   
EU and ECOWAS agreed on a roadmap for EPA negotiations in 2004.   
According to the roadmap the EPA would enter into force on January 1
st 2008.  There 
will be progressive establishment of a free trade zone, in accordance with WTO rules, 
between ECOWAS and the EU for a period of twelve years beginning in 2008.  The 
roadmap also restates the part of the Cotonou Agreement that indicates that the economic 
cooperation shall build on regional integration initiatives.
13  In October 2005 the EU 
Trade Commissioner met with West African Ministers to discuss the results so far and 
agree on the next phase of the EPA negotiations, starting in 2006. 
The EPA negotiations have been controversial.  The EU argues that partnership 
agreements will provide a platform for economic diversification and greater trade, 
thereby improving the prospects for development and poverty reduction.  Others see the 
EPAs as an opportunity for the deepening of ECOWAS’ integration process.  Critics say 
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that EPAs will force poor countries to open their economies prematurely, with potentially 
damaging economic and social consequences.  They argue that the EU, in pushing for 
market access by reducing tariff and non-tariff import barriers, could retard the growth of 
the West Africa’s manufacturing and agriculture by exposing these sectors to stiff 
competition from established industrial powers.
14
 
A significant issue concerning the negotiations with the EU is the budgetary 
impact of tariff reduction.  Developing nations frequently rely extensively on tariffs for 
financing government because of their relative ease of collection.  Estimates of the 
prospective impact of tariff elimination between EU and ECOWAS indicate that some of 
the participating countries could lose more than 20% of their government revenues.
15  A 
study by the Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HHIA) concludes that 
customs revenue would decline, and that in some countries overall budget revenues 
would be very large, reachung almost 80% in Cape Verde.
16  However, the same study 
finds that if ECOWAS opens its market to the EU, trade creation would be much larger 
than trade diversion for all member states except Ghana.  The study also raises the point 
that ECOWAS could abstain from the EPA and have recourse to non-reciprocal trade 
preferences provided by the “Everything But Arms” EU initiative for Least Developed 
Countries or the improved Generalized System Preference for non-LDCs (12 out of 15 
ECOWAS member states are LDCs).   
The potential long-term gains from EPAs will probably involve substantial short-
term adjustment costs.  Without removing supply-side constraints and improving the 
competitiveness of the ECOWAS countries, the EPAs will not automatically translate 
into economic development and poverty reduction.
17  Overall, the low level of 
development of the productive systems and infrastructures in ECOWAS and the issue of 
the competitiveness of its enterprises are often cited as points of concern.  
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Regional Infrastructure Initiatives 
In the infrastructure sectors, ECOWAS has initiated several projects in the areas 
of transport, energy, and telecommunications.  In several of these projects, such as the 
West African Power Pool, the West African Gas Pipeline, Training of West African 
Regulators, and the Harmonization of Telecommunications Policies, ECOWAS has been 
cooperating with NEPAD, EU, the World Bank, USAID and other donors.  
ECOWAS’ commitment to infrastructure is signified by the provisions of its 
founding treaty, which calls for cooperation in transport, communications and tourism: 
“Article 32 – Transport and communications 
For the purpose of ensuring the harmonious integration of the physical 
infrastructures of Member States and the promotion and facilitation of the movement of 
persons, goods and services within the Community, Member States undertake to evolve 
common transport and communications policies, laws and regulations. 
Article 33 – Posts and telecommunications 
In the area of telecommunications, Member States shall: 
  develop, modernize, co-ordinate and standardize their national 
telecommunications networks in order to provide reliable interconnection among 
Member States; 
  complete, with dispatch, the section of the pan-African telecommunications 
network situated in West Africa; 
  co-ordinate their efforts with regard to the operation and maintenance of the West  
African portion of the pan-African telecommunications network and in the 
mobilization of national and international financial resources. 
Member States also undertake to encourage the participation of the private sector 
in offering postal and telecommunications services, as a means of attaining the objectives 
set out in this Article.”
18 
In the telecommunications sector, the ECOWAS member states, like the rest of 
Africa, are struggling with very low penetration, poor service reliability and quality, and 
instable and incomplete policy reform (see Annex A).  However, most West African 
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countries have made important reforms.  With the exception of Sierra Leone, the Gambia 
and Liberia, all have adopted a basic telecommunications law, have established a 
regulatory body, and have introduced some competition in the mobile segment of the 
market.
19  Moreover, seven member states have privatized their state-owned operators.   
Despite these recent reforms, problems remain.  Penetration is still very low (only 
Cape Verde is listed in the medium category of the ITU Digital Access Index), rural areas 
remain unconnected, and prices are considered out of reach for much of the population.  
The newly created regulatory bodies are not considered autonomous, as they lack the 
power to make and to enforce regulations, and many face serious technical capacity 
problems.  Moreover, the small size of the region’s telecommunications markets and the 
perceived high-risk policy environment hamper the attraction of the requisite investment.   
ECOWAS has undertaken several regional projects in order to strengthen the 
regional backbone infrastructure, encourage competition, and integrate the sector in 
member countries.  Its ultimate objective is to create a common liberalized market by 
2007, with fully open interconnected networks and a teledensity of at least 10%.  The 
ECOWAS ICT Task Force has been established with the aim of harmonizing ICT 
policies in the member countries.  
 
Regional Telecommunications Projects 
Two of the earliest telecommunications projects were INTELCOM I and II.   
INTELCOM I was launched in 1984 and ended in 1994 with the completion of thirteen 
interstate telecommunications links.  The objective of the program was to improve and 
expand the sub-regional telecommunication network.  The program achieved 95 percent 
of its initial objectives, as confirmed by the evaluation undertaken by the International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU). 
After the successful implementation of the first program, ECOWAS’ Secretariat 
launched INTELCOM II in 1997.  The main objectives of the second program were to 
provide the community with a reliable and modern telecommunications network, capable 
of offering a wider variety of services.  The upgraded network would reduce transits 
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through countries outside Africa and improve direct links between the member states
20.  
During the program’s implementation, 32 interstate links were planned, mostly between 
capital cities.  The links would be realized on a bilateral basis with the participation of 
operators and assistance through the NEPAD action plan. 
The West African Telecommunications Regulation Association (now Assembly) 
was formed in 2002 to serve as a vehicle for harmonizing policies and integrating 
telecom development in the region.  Its primary purpose was to establish cooperation 
among West African States in the field of telecommunications regulation.  WATRA also 
aims at benefiting more countries from the limited resources available in the region for 
the development of regulatory frameworks for the promotion of ICT development. 
 
Harmonization of Telecommunications Policies Project 
In the same year, the ECOWAS secretariat – supported by the World Bank and 
Public Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPIAF) – launched a program to develop 
a common framework to facilitate the harmonization of national telecommunications 
policies.  The community commissioned a consultant team to develop a 
telecommunications harmonization study (launched in 2002) for integrating national 
legislative and regulatory arrangements, with a view to evolving a telecommunications 
common market for the region
21.  The primary objective of the study was to create a plan 
and timetable for harmonizing telecommunications policy in the ECOWAS region.  The 
study evaluated alternative approaches, especially from the perspective of potential 
investors.  The overall conclusions of the study are as follows:
22 
  substantial work has already been accomplished to create the legal framework in 
the member states; 
  several member states have adopted laws and regulations that largely meet 
expectations of international best practice;  
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  the ECOWAS Treaty and certain protocols adopted under it provide the legal 
framework within which member states may act to achieve maximum 
harmonization in line with the centralized harmonization model;
23 
  although the ECOWAS legal framework “looks good on paper,” there has been a 
failure to follow through expressed ideas and principles, and ECOWAS has a 
disappointing track record in advancing its Treaty initiatives;   
  resources are insufficient to perform enforcement and other regulatory functions. 
Other challenges are the different legal traditions of the member states, their different 
levels of liberalization, and the trade-offs that will affect the relative gains accruing to 
individual countries.
24 
The study also provided a set of recommendations with the view of attracting 
investment in the sector.  First of all, the study recommends ECOWAS to adopt the 
Centralized Harmonization Model, for which the legal framework for implementation 
already exists both at the country and at the Treaty level.  It also proposed an 
Implementation Schedule and a Draft Protocol as a starting point for discussion and 
negotiation among ECOWAS members.   
The study identified two key shortcomings of ECOWAS.  The first is the inability 
of ECOWAS to enact upon its decisions.  Under the Treaty, member states are required 
to take all the necessary steps to implement community policy objectives into their 
national legislation, but the track record shows that this frequently does occur.  The lack 
of implementation stems partly from the fact that there is no enforcement authority to 
guarantee follow through on Community decisions.  The recent creation of a Community 
Court of Justice is a step to the right direction.
25 
The second key area of concern is the lack of resources within ECOWAS and 
each member state.  The lack of resources goes beyond the financial and budgetary levels 
to include human resources, training, and expertise. 
                                                 
23 The study reviewed four harmonization models: centralized harmonization, separated jurisdiction, 
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25 Conclusions of the Special Event if Sahel and West Africa Club, Accra 2002: “Towards a better Regional 
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West African ICT Common Market Project 
Another ECOWAS initiative is the ITU West African ICT Market Harmonization 
Project, which is being financed by the European Commission.  The aim of the project is 
to promote policy development and regulatory reform in the region and to build human 
and institutional capacity in the field of ICT and regulatory reform through training, 
education and knowledge sharing.  The first phase of the project was launched in 2004.  
A series of workshops were held under the coordination of WATRA.   
The project took into account the ECOWAS vision – to have a single liberalized 
telecommunications market, following the adoption of uniform legislative and regulatory 
frameworks, and the interconnection and integration of national networks.  The project 
also builds on the recommendations and conclusions of the World Bank study on the 
Harmonization of Telecommunications Policies in ECOWAS
26.   
The project issued  a final set of guidelines in the following categories:
 27 
  establishing a national ICT policy and law; 
  interconnection; 
  licensing;  
  numbering; 
  radio spectrum management; 
  Universal access and universal service. 
 
Guidelines for establishing a national ICT policy 
ECOWAS has adopted the following guidelines relating to a model ICT Policy: 
• ICT policy must give prime focus to the sector  
• ICT Policy should address the following objectives: 
–Increasing the benefits from information technology for the country 
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–Building and contributing to a competitive national and regional ICT sector 
respectively 
–Providing affordable, ubiquitous and high quality services 
–Creating an enabling environment for sustainable ICT diffusion and development 
–Providing wide-spread access to ICT, including broadband through relevant 
universal access policies and programs 
–Encouraging innovations in technology development and use of technology 
–Promoting information sharing, transparency and accountability and reducing   
bureaucracy within and between organizations, and towards the public at large 
–Attaining a specified minimum level of information technology resources for 
educational institutions and government agencies 
–Providing individuals and organizations with a minimum level of ICT knowledge, 
and the ability to keep it up to date 
–Helping to understand information technology, its development and its cross-
disciplinary impact. 
• Key Challenges to the adoption of an acceptable and sustainable ICT Policy include: 
– Promotion of stakeholder awareness 
– Guarantee of broad-based stakeholder participation and planning 
– Political buy-in/champions on a local and national level 
– Coordination with other policies/priorities 
– Relevance and usefulness of policy and projects 
– Transparent decision making procedures 
– Sustainability of projects (training, financing, appropriateness of technologies) 
– Regional and international framework 
– Coordination with regional initiatives 
 
Guidelines for a model ICT law 
The EU/ITU guidelines focus on the basic elements of telecommunications or ICT 
law, including: functions of the Minister and the Commission, financial and related 
provisions, licenses and frequency authorizations, interconnection and access to facilities,    19
universal service/access and prices, dispute resolution, enforcement of the law, 
investigation and inspection, fair competition and equality of treatment and sanctions 
Guidelines for Interconnection 
The ITU/EU study proposes a number of guidelines for interconnection that are 
intended to facilitate the establishment of a transparent, fair and accessible regulatory 
environment to prepare the West African countries for opening to full competition.  The 
study also includes a suggested timeline for implementation in view of the ultimate 
objective of opening of the market in 2007.   
The guidelines on interconnection are divided in four categories: 
  Guidelines on aspects relating to infrastructure access 
  Guidelines on aspects relating to competition 
  Guidelines on aspects that are specific to operators with significant market power 
(SMP) 
  Guidelines on aspects specific to the settlements of disputes 
The following recommendations on the existing regulatory framework for 
interconnection were provided by the study: 
Recommendation 1: Equally important tools, such as carrier selection, number 
portability, co-location and local loop unbundling, should be included in legislation, 
interconnection regulations, or orders and supplemented by necessary regulatory 
decisions. 
Recommendation 2: A definition of relevant markets is needed, and a definition of 
dominant/SMP operators based on international best practice. 
Recommendation 3: The obligations of dominant/SMP operators should be listed in 
detail, and rules and conditions promulgated for their implementation. 
Recommendation 4: Dominant/SMP operators should be obliged to issue an interconnect 
reference offer every year, implement accounting separation, and undergo an annual audit 
of accounts, in addition to orienting their tariffs towards costs. 
Recommendation 5: It is recommended that a time limit should be established for settling 
disputes relating to interconnection, allowing a margin for the event that the allotted time 
proves to be inadequate.  The referral procedure should be specified in a separate decree.     20
Recommendation 6: All the interconnection-related decrees of the West African countries 
should be revised.  A special implementation calendar should be established for the 
regulatory tools, based on the opening to competition, of the fixed network in particular, 
within each of the countries concerned by this study. 
 
Guidelines for licensing 
The guidelines for licensing reflect international best practice as follows: 
  Basic Principles: the basic principles refer to competition, harmonization of 
procedures, and provision of service between ECOWAS member states.  In these 
aspects there is a need to harmonize the categories of telecommunications 
networks and services as well as licensing procedures.  ECOWAS member states 
will strive to define and adopt common classifications of telecommunications 
networks and services as well as common licensing procedures.  Member States 
shall coordinate to the extent possible their licensing procedures for companies 
wishing to establish or exploit telecommunications networks and/or a 
telecommunications services in more than one ECOWAS member state so that a 
company would to only complete one authorization request which it can 
subsequently submit in the various member states. 
  Market structure: the guidelines for market structure fall under the following 
categories: competitive framework, licensing regime, no barriers to entry, level of 
intervention and proposed market structure.  It is recommended that 
infrastructure-based competition is promoted to the largest extent possible given 
that this model has the advantage of favoring a maximum degree of competition 
while accommodating simultaneously the development of the sector in terms of 
universal service. Regarding the licensing regime the recommendation is to 
promote technology neutrality to the greatest extent possible e.g., not to specify 
technologies such as GSM, CDMA or UMTS) and/or service (e.g. unified license 
which does not limit the activities such as fixed or mobile).  Nevertheless, in the 
interests of transparency and simplicity, member states may decide that fixed and 
mobile networks should be licensed separately.  Member States should impose no 
limits which are not in conformity with their respective regulations on the number    21
of operators or service providers in the market.  If a member state limits the 
number of licenses, such a limitation must be justified.  Regarding the level of 
intervention, the Licensing Framework consists of three levels of intervention, 
ranging from individual licenses to class license (authorization or declaration) to 
open entry.  Different telecommunications networks and services will be 
categorized according to the adapted market structure. 
 
Guidelines for numbering 
The ITU/EU study lists a number of general approaches for numbering and some 
key points that can be applied to any numbering scheme.  A detailed listing of these 
points is beyond the scope of this study. 
 
Guidelines for radio spectrum management 
The guidelines for radio spectrum management are divided in 17 sub-categories 
that include among others: interference issues, global and regional regulatory framework, 
role of regulators, radio spectrum coordination, economic principles of spectrum 
management, auctions, and spectrum pricing. 
 
Guidelines for universal access and universal service 
The guidelines are listed in eight categories.  Below we list some of the most 
important guidelines for each category: 
 
Creating an enabling regulatory and policy environment 
  Governments must, at the highest level, identify ICT as a tool for socio-economic 
development. In doing so, governments should designate a national focal point 
(ministry, government department, other entity) for ICT development. 
  National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) must be established and given the 
statutory authority to play a key role in implementing universal access policies 
first through addressing the market efficiency gap (letting the market deliver 
universal access/service), and second through the true access gap. NRAs should 
be responsible for implementing policies directed towards assuring the best    22
quality reliable services at the most affordable prices that meet the needs of 
consumers–existing and future. 
 
Designing policies and determining regulatory reform measures 
  Formulate a national policy that identifies appropriate and realistic universal 
access/service objectives that take into account the differences between universal 
access–public access to ICTs–and universal service–household or private access 
to ICTs. 
  Conduct periodic public consultations to the extent possible with stakeholders to 
identify their needs and modify universal access/service and regulatory policies 
accordingly. 
  Design universal access/service policies, regulations and practices in order to 
create incentives for the private sector to expand service. 
  Establish a fair and transparent telecommunication regulatory framework that 
promotes universal access to ICTs. Allow the market to address universal 
access/service to the greatest extent possible and only intervene where the market 
has failed or it is anticipated to fail. 
 
Promoting innovative regulatory policies  
  Promotion of access to low cost broadband interconnectivity should be integrated 
from the local level to the international level. Governments, business, non-
governmental organizations and international organizations should be involved. 
  Adoption of regulatory regimes that facilitate the use of all transport mechanisms, 
whether wireline, power line, cable, wireless, including Wi-Fi, or satellite. 
  The NRAs should implement harmonized spectrum allocations consistent with the 
outcome of ITU Radiocommunication Conference process and each country’s 
national interest. 
 
Access to information and communication infrastructures 
  Provide services in a competitive framework, using new technologies that offer 
both innovative services and affordable pricing options    23
  A full range of public access options can be developed, including the creation of 
public tele-centers and multi-purpose community centers. 
 
Guidelines for providing subsidies: finance and management of universal access policy 
  Any funding or subsidies provided must be targeted and determined and delivered 
in a manner that is transparent, non-discriminatory, cost-effective, and 
competitively neutral. 
  Subsidies must be targeted. 
  Subsidies can be provided using several means including: universal service funds, 
competitive minimum-subsidy auctions, and public access projects can be 
designed to achieve long-term financial self-sustainability. 
Guidelines on monitoring and reviewing policies  
  Countries should adopt measurable targets for improving connectivity and access 
in the use of ICTs which can be based on distance, population density or time 
taken to have access to ICTs. 
  Countries should review universal access/service policies, regulations, targets and 
practices periodically to adapt to the evolving nature of ICT services and the 
needs of end users. 
In October 2005 regulators from the fifteen countries signed an agreement to 
adopt the common regulatory framework for their national ICT policies, based on the 
ICT/EU guidelines.  The guidelines will be submitted to the national communications 
ministers and heads of state of ECOWAS and UEMOA to be approved as directives to be 
applied throughout the region.
28  In May 2006 in Abuja, the ministers in charge of 
telecommunications and ICT adopted the harmonized ICT regulatory decisions for the 
establishment of an integrated ICT market in the ECOWAS region.  Upon adoption by 
the ECOWAS council of ministers in June 2006, the implementation phase begins.
29 
 
                                                 
28 Source: ITU press release October 7
th 2005. 
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Regional Roaming Project   
Another telecommunications integration project was initiated in 2003.  ECOWAS 
Council mandated the Executive Secretariat to explore the feasibility of establishing a 
region-wide GSM roaming facility based on the use of one SIM card in all Member 
States.  Currently it costs more to make calls to Member States within the region than to 
Europe and the United States.  Although a number of GSM service providers have signed 
bilateral roaming arrangements these usually involve post paid customers, when more 
than 90% of the GSM subscribers are pre-paid customers.
30  
A subsequent study on GSM roaming confirmed the technical and economic 
feasibility of cross-border connectivity but stressed the necessity of substantial 
investment in requisite infrastructure.  To this end the report recommended that the 
embargo on the use of the Special Fund for Telecommunications (SFT) be lifted, so that 
member states could access it for the construction of uncompleted sections of the links
31.  
In January 2006, the ECOWAS Council of Ministers endorsed the 
recommendations of the study for the GSM roaming facility and approved the use of SFT 
to construct the identified gaps in inter-state links.  At the same time, ECOWAS 
announced that two sub-groups had been set up by its technical branch on GSM Roaming 
to address the issues of interconnectivity and tariff harmonization that will facilitate the 
introduction of a region-wide roaming facility by the end of the year.   
The ECOWAS Technical Group has also proposed some measures for 
implementation under a tripartite Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) involving 
member states, telecommunications regulators and GSM operators that will enhance the 
creation of an environment conducive to the goals of the roaming project.  The measures 
include the adoption of laws that will promote the implementation of cross-border 
connectivity, the liberalization of international gateways to include mobile networks, the 
implementation of a fiscal incentive regime that will reduce tariffs on international calls 
and the operation of a regulatory framework that will support the full utilization of 
transmission capacity.  The MOU calls for the introduction of appropriate incentives that 
would encourage member states to develop their transmission capacities and upgrade 
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their networks.  Member States are also required under the MOU to, among others, work 
towards the inter-operability of their networks, enter into public private partnership 
agreements to ensure cross border connectivity and refrain from actions that would 
prevent or distort competition in the sector
32. 
 
Cross-Border Connectivity Project 
Within the context of the ITU/EU work, the first World Bank harmonization 
study, and the ECOWAS Technical Group on GSM Roaming work, ECOWAS and 
WATRA initiated a cross-border connectivity project.  The aims were to identify 
connectivity gaps and regulatory, commercial and policy obstacles to cross-border 
connectivity and develop a strategy addressing these gaps
33.   
According to the study, traffic is often routed through third party countries 
(mostly Europe and the United States), making cross-border telecom services costly.   
There is also reliance on older technologies for intra-regional and long-haul traffic that 
raises concerns on speed, capacity and costs.  More operators rely on satellite for both the 
exchange of national and sub-regional traffic.  The SAT-3 submarine cable, introduced in 
2002, offers the most capacity and international connectivity, but it is run by incumbents 
that exert monopolistic pressures on prices and limit the access of countries not directly 
connected to the cable.  The high tariffs have held back the utilization of the system.  
According to the report some of the capacity constraints could be alleviated by 
alternative infrastructure providers who run other distribution networks such as transport, 
electricity, oil and gas and deploy their own communications networks along their long-
haul routes to service their own needs.  There are currently two cross-border fiber routes 
of this form in use: the Manantali Hydro Electric Power project linking Mali and 
Mauritania with Senegal and the Chad-Cameroon pipeline.  
In addition to the technical obstacles, the report states that coordination and 
cooperation among ECOWAS member states is limited.  The lack of cooperation is found 
at all levels:  between national regulators, between national governments and 
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international organizations, between state-run operators, between incumbent wire-line 
access providers and entrants.  Also, many international gateways are run by incumbents, 
raising cross-border issues about interconnection and pricing.   
According to the study, since intra-regional trade represents only 5-10% of 
international voice traffic in the region, the sub-regional network’s main function should 
be to provide to landlocked countries and countries without connection to international 
infrastructure access to submarine cable landing points.  The study lists a number of gaps 
that would become the main missing links in a backhaul network facilitating access for 
all ECOWAS countries that are not yet connected to the Sat-3/WASC cable or other 
future international submarine fibre systems.  
Another issue is who should invest, own, and operate new cross-border links.  
According to the study the case for investing in cross-border infrastructure rests on the 
traffic growth generated by the private operators, not incumbents.  These operators tend 
to construct their own infrastructure wherever possible, using satellite connectivity.  Only 
in a few cases do they establish cross-border infrastructure. For private operators to use 
the cross-border networks of incumbent operators, a market-based solution must be 
implemented.  
The study identifies a number of policy and regulatory safeguards that would 
create an enabling regional environment for the success of the cross-border initiatives.  
First of all, it recommends institutional strengthening and capacity building in the two 
main regional agencies, ECOWAS and WATRA, in order for them to be able to regulate 
harmonize and implement ICT policies.  
The other basic recommendations are as follows:  
  Lower Sat-3/WASC tariffs to incentivise greater international traffic flows onto 
the cable.  
  Harmonize international gateway licensing procedures to help overcome 
‘artificial’ barriers within the ECOWAS region to flows of intra-regional traffic.  
  ECOWAS Intra-Regional Interconnection Service: ECOWAS countries need 
cross-border interconnection agreements between states to allow traffic flow.  In 
April 2005, at least two out of the five cross-border fiber links were not 
operational pending the finalization of interconnection agreements.     27
  International termination charges: The effect of implementing a transit service 
within ECOWAS is that traffic from an operator in one country can flow to 
another uninhibited by tariffs or licensing barriers.  
 
WATRA’s Satellite and Wireless Guidelines 
In May 2006, WATRA proposed guidelines on Satellite and Wireless regulation.  
These guidelines were prepared by WATRA in the context of the Catalysing Access to 
ICT in Africa (CATIA) program.  The initiative aimed to develop new regulatory 
practices that reflect the emerging wireless technologies in order to attract more 
investment in the region and ultimately improve access and ICT service delivery.  The 
initiative is also in line with ECOWAS’ aim of promoting and encouraging the 
harmonization of regulations in the region.  The guidelines take into consideration 
international best practice in satellite policy, initiatives for the harmonization of wireless 
regulation in other regions, as well as other ECOWAS’ initiatives for the harmonization 
and improvement of the telecommunications sector
34.  
The key elements of these guidelines are the following:
35 
 
Policy and regulatory framework 
–  Urgent steps need to be taken to provide realistic policy frameworks and 
regulatory regimes to facilitate a more aggressive adoption of wireless 
communications technologies. 
–  Key policy changes to be implemented to facilitate the increased deployment of 
wireless systems will include: independence of regulators, transparent licensing 
procedures, establishment of competition safeguards, transparent and non-
discriminatory universal service obligations, adoption of lower licensing fees and 
taxes in line with global trends.  
 
Satellite and wireless regulation, policies and principles 
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–  Generally, the following principles are considered as key issues for wireless 
regulation: transparency of rules and policies, content and technology neutrality, 
protection of public safety, "Open Skies" policy to the extent possible, minimal 
spectrum management regulation and fair competitive access (non-discriminatory 
market access). 
–  Transparency to be facilitated by the publishing of information on rules and 
policies regarding telecommunications in dedicated websites. 
–  Governments should encourage service neutral regulation as far as possible. 
–  Regulatory bodies in the region are encouraged to maintain technology-neutral 
regulatory policy principles. 
–  With regard to licensing of satellite and wireless services, regulation is required to 
protect public safety.  
 
Spectrum Management: 
--  Governments should examine the extent to which spectrum assignments for public  
     services are being efficiently used regularly.  
 
Licensing wireless and satellite networks: 
–  WATRA should encourage harmonization of licensing for satellite services by 
adopting common licensing rules.  
–  WATRA should progressively implement a policy of non-limitation of the 
number of licenses; similarly, there should be no limit to the number of earth 
stations that a licensee may wish to operate. However, member states may limit 
the number of individual licenses for any category of telecommunications services 
and for the establishment and/or operation of telecommunications infrastructure, 
but this should only occur to the extent required to ensure the efficient use of 
radio frequencies.  
–  When applying the "first-come, first-served" method in allocating scarce 
resources, governments should set strict rules in order to ensure that license 
applicants have genuine need for the spectrum.     29
–  Where auctions are used for granting licenses, WATRA members should be 
aware that license duration is an important consideration.  
–  WATRA members should negotiate with caution while granting licenses through 
auctions in order not to bar access to the market for other operators for an 
unreasonably long period of time.  
–  While it is up to individual governments to decide which licensing approach (e.g. 
auctions, beauty contest, first-come, first-served, etc),  is the most appropriate to 
their environment, they should ensure that regardless of the method chosen, the 
process is objective, transparent, non-discriminatory and proportionate, ensuring 
the optimum use of the spectrum and the preservation of public interest.  
–  WATRA should encourage the adoption of "Open Skies" policies which would 
permit increased access to orbital resources, regardless of the satellite operators’ 
country of origin.  
–  WATRA member states should establish a harmonized list of licensing conditions 
that may be required from license applicants. 
–  WATRA should promote in the region, the application of harmonized license 
duration which should be extended to the maximum duration possible.  
–  License revocation should only take place in exceptional cases--governments should 
instead apply sanctions for minor breaches of license conditions and impose 
financial penalties, as appropriate. 
 
Licensing Fees: 
The following principles are recommended for setting licensing fees:  
–  It is considered appropriate to have fees only for satellite and wireless services i.e. 
annual license fee and frequency usage fee. 
–  The annual license fee is to be treated as an administrative fee based on 
transparent cost recovery schemes determined by actual or projected costs of the 
regulator which are in turn allocated among operators on the basis of revenues, 
types of services etc.     30
–  In a harmonized environment, all WATRA members will adopt the same 
principles in determining the costs to be used for calculating license fees. These 
fees may not be the same but must be comparable. 
–  Administrations costs incurred and charges collected by regulators should be 
published annually to promote transparency.  
 
Mutual Recognition of Type Approvals: 
–  WATRA members are encouraged not to duplicate the regulatory efforts of other 
countries, or impede the importation of transmission equipment though potentially 
onerous type approval requirements.   
–  WATRA members should, as far as possible, accept equipment approvals and 
certificates issued by other countries, or by recognized international certification 
bodies so as to eliminate the need for type approval requirements on a country-by-
country basis.  
–  WATRA should put a regional mutual recognition and conformity assessment 
procedure in place to be adopted by its member states. This would include testing 
centers and issuing type approval certificates.  
 
Implementation of the Guidelines and Enforcement of Regulations: 
–  WATRA members to review and adopt the Guidelines.  
–  WATRA Working Groups to develop action plans in line with priority areas 
identified by WATRA Administrations.  
–  WATRA and CATIA to provide support to member states to make policy changes 
as per the Guidelines and national priorities.  
–  WATRA members should establish capacity (human resources, equipment) for 
monitoring the use of the spectrum to ensure adherence to the regulations.  
–  WATRA members to apply sanctions as necessary to ensure strict compliance 
with the regulations. 
     31
 
Other Related Regional Projects 
Other initiatives in the telecommunications sector include:  
  The regulatory capacity building that forms part of the EU/ITU harmonization 
project.  The main objective of the project is to develop and provide regional ICT 
regulatory reform training resources and sessions tailored to the needs of the West 
African Region.  Training will focus in the areas of cost modeling, universal 
access policies, competition management and economic analysis of the market, 
and effective regulation.
36  
  The establishment of regional database management system in collaboration with 
ITU.
37  The ECOWAS Secretariat has facilitated the establishment of an 
Information Management System (SIGTEL) in partnership with ITU.  Its 
objective is to establish an information center for potential investors in the 
telecommunications industry in the West African region. 
The number of initiatives and projects for the integration and harmonization of the 
telecommunications policies in the West Africa region indicates that there is a will within 
ECOWAS to achieve this goal.  It remains to be seen whether the initiatives will translate 
into reality and the guidelines and recommendations will be followed through by the 
Community itself and by all the member states.   
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IV.  The Benefits of Regionalizing Regulatory Policy  
 
  Until the 1980s, conventional wisdom held that telecommunications was a natural 
monopoly in which competition was bound to be inefficient.  Now this conventional 
wisdom is known to be incorrect.  Even in less developed nations with low telephone 
penetration, substantial competition already exists in most telecommunications services.  
Nevertheless, in some components of telecommunications competition is weak, in part 
because of the inheritance of a former state-owned monopoly provider of wire-line access 
and backbone transmission services.  Despite the irresistible spread of technology-driven 
competition, direct regulation of some aspects of telecommunications is necessary until 
the transition to a reasonably competitive sector is complete.  Regulation can ensure fair 
treatment of customers who still lack the protection that comes from the availability of 
competitive alternatives.  Regulation also can ensure nondiscriminatory access of would-
be competitors to bottleneck telecommunications facilities that are controlled by the 
incumbent firms.  If the incumbent telecommunications entities were to operate 
completely without regulatory restraint, they could use their control of bottleneck 
facilities to force rivals to bend to their will or to destroy those rivals altogether (box 1).  
 
   
 
 
Box 1  Ghana Telecom 
 
In comparison with other Africa countries, Ghana has done relatively well in fixed line 
telephony.  With respect to mobile telephony, Ghana’s performance is not nearly as positive.  Mobile 
telephony in Ghana started early within an African context.  However, the subsequent development 
has not been as fast as in many other African countries. 
There is probably no simple explanation for this situation, but an obvious explanation for the 
relatively good performance in fixed access is the partial privatization of Ghana telecom and the 
accompanying requirements on extensions on the number of subscribers.  With regard to the less 
positive performance in mobile communications, one explanation could be the unclear regulatory 
situation in Ghana, especially in the area of interconnection.  All mobile operators, the second fixed 
operator Westel, and the rural operator Capital telecom have had great problems with Ghana Telecom 
over interconnection.  And, the regulator has proved to be ineffective in solving the problem.  A 
regulator was created in connection with the overall change in the telecom environment in Ghana in 
1997, but it has never had any real strength to intervene in the market in order to create a more level 
playing field among the operators. 
 
Source: Frempong and Henten (2004).    33
 
  The transition to a reasonably competitive telecommunications industry also can be 
facilitated by competition (antitrust or anti-monopoly) policy, the purpose of which is to 
ensure that competition is not suppressed either by collusion or combinations of 
competitors, or by the exercise of private monopoly power to exclude rivals from a fair 
opportunity to compete.  In many countries, competition laws and the agencies that enforce 
them have proven to be especially effective at preventing vertical leveraging – that is, acts 
by incumbent monopolists in wire-line access or long-distance transmission from extending 
their market power into other services, such as wireless access, Internet services, and value-
added services. 
  If structural reorganization in the telecommunications sector is to be successful, the 
regulatory regime must be effective.  Research on the effects of telecommunications reforms 
reveals that the organization and architecture of regulatory governance is critical to the 
ongoing success of a telecommunications reform program. Thus, the reform process must 
include an appropriate mechanism of institutional governance, as well as guideposts for the 
substantive content of that governance.  So long as regulation is necessary, if only to effect a 
transition to an essentially unregulated competitive market, the regulatory process is capable 
of executing that transition efficiently, or of obstructing and distorting it, or indeed rendering 
achievement of that ultimate substantive goal impossible.  For this reason, the ex-ante 
planning of post-reform regulatory governance should give equal weight to the regulatory 
process and to the substantive regulatory policies that issue from that process or are 
effectuated by it. 
  The most urgent tasks for policy towards the telecommunications sectors in West 
Africa are to remove the remaining obstacles to competition and to improve the 
effectiveness of regulatory frameworks.  Problems are likely to arise from inexperience with 
economic regulation, lack of sufficient information and technical skills to regulate 
effectively, and susceptibility to political interference on behalf of specific service providers 
or users that seek special favors. 
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Political Factors Influencing Regulation and the Risk of Capture 
The textbook “public interest” theory of regulation presumes that the purpose of 
regulatory intervention is the enhancement of economic welfare via improved efficiency 
and that regulatory agencies faithfully pursue this objective.  The “positive political” 
theory (PPT) of regulation explicitly challenges these assumptions.  This theory seeks to 
explain how particular forms of regulation emerge and change by evaluating the gains 
and losses of various organized interests arising from alternative institutional 
arrangements.  This model of regulatory policy decisions identifies two extreme 
conditions that produce poor performance by regulated firms:  “capture” (when regulators 
work to enhance the market power of a regulated firm) and “expropriation” (when 
regulators refuse to allow a regulated firm to recover the reasonable long-run costs of 
service).  According to PPT, where a regulatory agency lies on the continuum between 
capture and expropriation depends on how it is organized, the resources that it has, and its 
relationship to the political process. 
One distinctive difference between public interest and political-economic theories 
is that the former predicts efficient prices and use of labor, whereas the latter predicts 
inefficiencies.  According to PPT, prices will be regarded as a means of taxing some 
consumers to subsidize others, while labor, as an organized group, will benefit from 
regulation.  Trade unions may align themselves with management to seek prices above 
costs and barriers to competitive entry, then seek to appropriate some of the resulting 
monopoly profits in the form of higher wages.
38 
The  PPT of regulation is based on simple but important insights.  Regulation is a 
coercive policy instrument that can be used to provide valuable benefits to particular 
groups. All regulatory policy decisions are inherently conflictual in that they pit one firm 
against another, or suppliers against their customers.  PPT views regulatory policy 
decisions as the result of a competition among organized interests seeking their own 
private gains.  But this competition does not normally produce an efficient outcome due 
to  representation bias:  that is, some groups have few or no resources to devote to 
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influencing regulatory policy.  All else equal, groups that have more resources to commit 
to the regulatory policy-making process will receive more benefits from regulation, at the 
expense of groups who are poorly represented. 
Participants in the regulatory process seek to policy in several ways.  One way of 
exercising influence is to seek intervention by political allies.  Another is to submit 
information to regulators that supports a favorable decision.  Still another is outright 
corruption.  All of these require that an interest has financial and political resources to 
expend on regulatory policy-making processes.  Representation bias arises because 
groups differ in their access to these resources. 
One source of representation bias is that not all interests are equally motivated to 
apply the same pressure on political officials to intervene on their behalf.  Political 
pressure here refers to a credible threat to withhold support from an official whose policy 
preferences and actions are unsatisfactory to that interest.  Because participation is 
motivated by the prospect for economic gains, the resources that a group will commit to 
participation will be determined  by their expected benefits and costs: that is, by the 
stakes of a group in regulatory outcomes and the costs they must incur to become 
effectively represented.  In general, groups that are already organized, that are small and 
homogeneous in their interest, and that have high per capita stakes are more likely to be 
represented.  In particular, the regulated firms and perhaps a few large users and input 
suppliers are likely to participate actively, while most other users are not.  Moreover, 
firms and industries that do not yet exist because service is so poor also will not be 
represented. 
A second reason for representation bias is incomplete information.  Because 
information is imperfect, policy makers seek data from more expert sources.  For 
information pertaining to the details of technology, demand and costs in an industry, 
those who supply services frequently have extensive private information that is necessary 
for making efficient policy.  Because all parties can be expected to submit information 
that is beneficial to their interests, on balance the effect of the information that they do 
submit will bias policy outcomes in favor of those with relevant private information, such 
as the incumbent former monopoly provider.    36
The third source of representation bias relates to the interests and experiences of 
regulators.  This bias arises when agencies are staffed by officials who are not fully 
representative of all the groups affected by a regulatory policy, whether organized or not.  
For example, in a parliamentary system with strong, ideologically based parties, each 
important economic interest (say, labor versus ownership, or one industry versus another) 
may be represented by only one party, so that swings in the partisan control of 
government cause swings in the identity of the interests that regulators will favor.  In 
addition, regulatory officials may de inclined to favor some interests for other than 
political reasons.  For example, regulators may expect to have short government careers, 
and so may seek to enhance their post-regulation employment by favoring a likely future 
employer.  Or, some specialized skills of regulators may be obtained or usefully applied 
only in organizations that actively participate in the regulatory process, so that regulators 
naturally are inclined to think like those who are represented before their agency.  An 
example of a common source of representation bias in newly liberalizing countries arises 
when the staff of the regulatory agency is selected from among the staff of the incumbent 
service provider or the ministry that oversees its operation. 
Representation bias can lead to the common problem of regulatory capture 
because regulated firms are generally much better organized and able to manipulate the 
political process than their customers and suppliers are.  This happens in two main ways.  
First, producers may work through elected officials to have laws passed and decrees 
issued that correct what they perceive to be a pressing problem.  Sometimes the problem 
is alleged destructive competition.  Or it may reflect producers' desire to avoid spoiling 
the market through excessive new entry.  Second, even when elected officials have only 
the public interest at heart in passing regulatory laws, and regulatory agencies are 
established for "public interest" purposes, they subsequently can become the tools of the 
industry they regulate.  This happens because the regulated enterprise has superior 
technical knowledge upon which regulatory agency staffs come to depend (stated 
differently, the information needed for imposing controls is frequently only available 
from the regulated firm), and because regulated firms can use their political influence to 
have friendly regulators appointed. 
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The Risk of Expropriation and the Importance of Commitment 
  Services delivered by infrastructure industries are massively consumed and 
regarded as “social,” “basic,” and “essential” both to the public and for the effective 
functioning of the economy.  The reasons for the political significance of these industries 
are many.  These industries account for as much as ten percent of gross domestic product 
and, because they are capital intensive, as much as twenty percent of gross domestic 
investment.  Consequently, expenditures on infrastructure services at cost-based prices 
represent a substantial proportion of the budget for many households, and are beyond the 
means of the poorest families.  Moreover, since infrastructure services are essential 
intermediate inputs for other sectors of the economy, their quality and prices are a major 
determinant of the production costs and international competitiveness of infrastructure-
intensive industries.  In view of their unique characteristics, the pricing of infrastructure 
services generally receives considerable political attention and is thoroughly scrutinized 
by interest groups and even the general public.  In fact, cultural attitudes toward paying 
the full cost of these services change relatively slowly, and price increases frequently 
generate considerable public opposition. 
  These characteristics can motivate governments to behave opportunistically vis-à-
vis privatized utilities.  The fact that the utility industries are monopolistic and provide 
services that are deemed essential leads to considerable public scrutiny of their conduct 
and politicization of their pricing.  The presence of only one or two utility operators 
raises immediate concerns about concentrated and exploitative market power, excessive 
prices and profits, and restriction of freedom of choice.  Also, since utility services are 
massively consumed, they create significant opportunities for political mobilization, 
consumer and special-interest group activism, and populist manipulation (Spiller and 
Savedoff  1999). 
A utility can continue operating so long operating revenues exceed operating 
costs.  Because a large portion of infrastructure costs are fixed and sunk, once the 
investment is made, operating costs are only a small fraction of total costs.  Moreover, the 
sunk assets by definition cannot be redeployed elsewhere.  Thus, utilities are highly 
vulnerable to administrative expropriation of their vast quasi-rents, i.e. their revenues in 
excess of operating costs.  For example, after the investment is made, the government can    38
effectively expropriate this investment by setting prices too low to allow full recovery of 
costs and cause unnecessary cost increases by dictating inefficient investment, 
procurement and employment practices.  Of course, utility investors are fully aware of 
this problem.  Consequently, private investors will be unwilling to invest in these sunk 
assets unless the government is able to make a credible commitment not to expropriate 
these sunk costs.  
  The extent of the commitment problem is determined by the interaction of 
technology and politics—the characteristics of the technology underlying the industry’s 
production, the demand facing its products, and the country’s institutional and political 
endowment.  In sectors like water where technology is changing very slowly, the rate of 
depreciation of investments is low, and the product is considered as vital to human life, 
sunk costs and the risk of expropriation are very high.  In telecommunications, on the 
other hand, technology is changing very rapidly, the rate of depreciation is high, and the 
product, while important, is not vital to human life.  Thus sunk costs and the risk of 
expropriation will be lower and the commitment problem will be less severe in 
telecommunications relative to the water sector. 
 
Regulatory Design Implications 
  The solution to both capture and expropriation is the same:  to construct a 
regulatory agency that is unlikely to be unduly influenced by any particular interests.  
Basically, the design of the agency must allow regulators to have access to as much 
relevant information as is needed to make reasonably efficient decisions, must assure that 
the decision makers are neither homogeneous in their biases nor subject to unbalanced 
external pressure, and must create a mechanism whereby neutral arbiters can intervene if 
an agency makes an unreasonable decision.  These requirements raise three quite 
different organizational issues:  how to design the decisionmaking process within an 
agency, how to connect the agency to the larger system of government, and how to 
articulate and enforce the principles for deciding whether an agency has acted 
unreasonably or unfairly.  The arrangements that achieve these objectives are as follows. 
First, the personnel of regulatory agencies should be heterogeneous and stable.  
Short-term changes in the political control of government should not cause dramatic    39
short-term swings in the composition of the agency, and the careers of regulatory officials 
should be secure through political change as well as long enough so that regulators are 
not constantly engaging in on-the-job training and then seeking interesting future 
employment possibilities.  The personnel requirement implies that civil service 
procedures should govern influential regulatory positions, and that political appointments 
to agencies should not be purely partisan.
39  The U.S. independent regulatory 
commission, in which political appointments to a multi-headed body are for several years 
and are subject to partisan diversity rules, represents the extreme form of insulation from 
political pressures.  The British and Japanese systems, in which heads of regulatory 
authorities and their lieutenants are professionals, but policy authority rests in a cabinet 
ministry run by a partisan appointment, seek to achieve independence by giving more 
authority to civil servants. 
Second, the agency can be given independent authority and resources to compel 
information from regulated firms, generate information on its own, and represent interests 
that otherwise are not organized to participate in its processes.  For example, regulators 
should be able to develop their own procedures for estimating costs and demand, and 
should be able to undertake their own investigations on alternative technologies and on 
the performance of domestic firms that they do not regulate or regulated firms in other 
nations.  In some cases, separate bureaus within the agency can be established to 
advocate unrepresented interests.   
Third, the agency can be subject to openness requirements.  The agency can be 
required to conduct all business in public, to refrain from secret contacts with either 
interested parties or political officials, and to release all relevant information pertaining to 
                                                 
39 Safeguards that can help achieve these objectives include: 
  Giving the regulator statutory authority, free of ministerial control. 
  Setting clear professional criteria for appointing regulators. 
  Requiring that both the executive and legislative branches participate in appointments. 
  Appointing regulators for fixed periods and prohibiting their removal without clearly defined cause 
(subject to formal review). 
  Staggering the terms of an agency’s board members so that they can be replaced only gradually by 
successive administrations. 
  Funding agency operations with user fees or levies on service providers, to insulate agencies from 
political interference through the budget process. 
  Prohibiting the executive branch from overturning an agency’s decisions except through new 
legislation or judicial appeals of existing laws. 
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a decision as well as a preliminary indication of the decision it is likely to make before 
the actual decision is made.  Openness requirements are beneficial because they give 
advance warning to those who are affected by a decision, enabling them to intervene if 
the decision is unfavorable, but simultaneously guaranteeing that both the existence and 
the content of their intervention will be public.  Openness forces regulators to reveal the 
informational basis for their decision, and is therefore useful for revealing whether the 
agency’s decision is biased and unsupported by facts (McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast, 
1987 and 1989). 
Fourth, the agency can be required to publicly articulate the basic economic 
principles that guide its policy decisions (Willig 1999).  Before the telecommunications 
industry is restructured and private investments are made, the agency should commit to 
the transparent application of these principles to reach decisions and resolve disputes.  To 
enhance government credibility, these principles should be contained in an overarching 
statute and so have the force of law.  Alternatively, they can be embedded in privatization 
and concession contracts that are legally binding on the government, even through 
partisan change.
40 
Fifth, the decisions of the agency can be subject to review by another body that is 
freer of representation biases, especially biases affecting participation in the agency’s 
processes, at the instigation of anyone who is dissatisfied with a decision.  The most 
                                                 
40 These principles can require the agency to: 
  Refrain from unilaterally imposing policy or rule changes that undercut promised investment 
value. 
  Refrain from intervening in activities of regulated firms that relate to competitive markets, or at 
least markets not identified as protected natural monopolies. 
  Avoid expanding regulatory interventions without demonstrating that the benefits outweigh the 
costs. 
  Ensure competitive service quality and prices by avoiding privatization deals that result in higher 
prices than necessary, allowing consumers to challenge deals that result in higher prices in return 
for higher government revenue, using price cap mechanisms to control regulated monopoly prices, 
and allowing consumers to seek rate adjustments if service quality falls far short of that promised 
in a privatization agreement.  
  Provide consumers, suppliers of complementary and substitute services, suppliers of inputs, and 
investors with signals and incentives for efficient actions by ensuring that prices reflect the value 
and marginal costs of services and by giving service providers pricing flexibility. 
  Require telecommunications monopolists to give rivals open access to their bottleneck facilities at 
prices with the same markups as the competing services sold by these monopolists. 
  Pay competitively neutral attention to social goals pertinent to each infrastructure sector by 
targeting subsidies as much as possible and requiring that any surcharges or taxes imposed have 
equal effects on the prices charged by competing suppliers (Willig 1999).    41
common reviewing body is a general purpose court that itself is politically independent 
and diverse in composition (Levy and Spiller, 1996).  The advantage of the general 
purpose court is that it is less likely to favor a particular industrial interest and less likely 
to regard itself as possessing sufficient specialized expertise that it can substitute its own 
technical analysis for that of the regulator.  The issues to be decided through judicial 
review are whether the decision is supported by the evidence, is authorized by the 
regulator’s formal policy objectives, as stated in its formal legal mandate, and respects 
limitations that are imposed by high law.  The use of judicial review, by implication, 
requires that the agency’s authority and decision-making processes be clearly specified in 
some form of legal document, such as legislation or decree, which predates the decision 
under review. 
Sixth, the agency should have a competent, non-political, professional staff, 
expert in the relevant economic, accounting, engineering and legal principles and familiar 
with good regulatory practice elsewhere.  Regulatory capacity is required to manage the 
competitive restructuring of the telecommunications industry and to subject it to market 
discipline, as well as to avoid capture by overcoming representation bias in the 
information and expertise that is presented to it by organized interests.  Thus, the 
agency’s responsibilities should match its financial and human resources.  In some cases, 
achieving this objective requires exempting the agency agencies from civil service salary 
caps in order to enable it to attract and retain well-qualified staff. 
  The unfortunate part of the above litany of procedural and structural safeguards is 
that they are costly to implement and assume the presence of a cadre of technically trained 
civil servants and a highly developed legal system, neither of which is yet present in most 
ECOWAS countries.  Well-developed economic, accounting, engineering, and legal skills 
are required for regulatory functions such as monitoring industry performance, analyzing 
cost data, dealing with information asymmetries, and analyzing the behavior of regulated 
firms.  An independent judiciary that is skilled in adjudicating disputes involving arcane 
technical information and that adheres to the Rule of Law also is necessary to assure that the 
regulatory agency is performing its functions honestly and competently. 
  In some large developing countries with a substantial middle class, these safeguards 
plausibly are present and affordable, so that a recommendation to implement western-style    42
regulatory agencies is not out of the question.  In small ECOWAS countries, the domestic 
supply of professionals to implement this kind of regulatory system is low and inelastic, the 
political system is unstable, and the Rule of Law enforced by a competent independent 
judiciary is not in place.  Thus, the pre-requisites for effective regulation of 
telecommunications are not likely to be satisfied, creating a significant, long-run barrier to 
the creation of an effective telecommunications industry. 
  In 1999, the telecommunications regulatory frameworks of 29 African countries 
were assessed in terms of their autonomy, credibility, transparency, and efficiency.  Among 
the ECOWAS countries, the report included Benin, Cote d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, 
Nigeria, Senegal and Togo (EIU–Pyramid Research 1999).  On a ranking of 1 (lowest) to 4 
(highest), all the ECOWAS countries that were included in the report received the lowest 
score of 1 on autonomy; Benin, Nigeria, Gambia, and Togo also received the lowest score of 
1 on regulatory credibility.  Only Cote d’Ivoire had a score above 2 in any of the four 
dimensions of regulatory performance (3 on credibility and efficiency).
41 
  Since this assessment, considerable progress has been made in some ECOWAS 
nations, but many still are characterized by a very poorly performing parastatal monopoly in 
fixed access, long distance and international communications, combined with a weak 
regulatory system for supporting competition and growth in other services, such as wireless 
telephony and Internet services.  All of the countries in the region have established some sort 
of regulatory agency for their telecommunications sectors, but in many cases these agencies 
lack independence and are mere extensions of sectoral ministries.  Many governments 
continue to keep a tight grip on telecommunications while favoring poorly performing state-
owned enterprises.  Some independent agencies suffer from insufficient resources and legal 
authority.  Annex A contains descriptions of the regulatory systems in West Africa.  Here we 
provide a sketch of some of these agencies. 
  In Benin, the regulatory authority has been La Direction de la Politique des Postes 
et Télécommunications (DPPT);
42  however, this agency is part of the Ministry of 
Communication and New Information and Communication Technologies 
                                                 
41 Pyramid Research. 1999. Privatizing Telecoms Markets.  Boston, Mass: The Economist Intelligence 
Unit. 
42  Metozouve Dieudonné, “L’EXPERIENCE DU BENIN DANS LE DOMAINE DE REGULATION,” at 
www.cipaco.org/sources/convergence/communication%20MCPTN.doc.    43
Promotion, which in turn is substantially influenced by the state-owned telecom 
operator, the Office des Postes et Telecommunications.  On March 1, 2006, just 
before the presidential election of 2006, the outgoing President created an 
independent regulatory authority, l’Autorité de Régulation des Postes et des 
Télécommunications (ARPT),
43 but on May 1, the newly elected President 
suspended the agency. 
  In Burkina Faso, l’Autorité National de Régulation des Télécommunications 
(ARTEL) is not an independent regulatory authority.
44  Eight members of its board 
of directors represent government ministries, and the ninth is appointed by the 
workers of the national operator, ONATEL.  Moreover, ARYEL’s regulations are 
effectively only advisory, as the Minister of Telecommunications can reject or 
revise any regulation proposed by the agency. 
  Cape Verde has a partially privatized monopoly, Cabo Verde Telecom (CVT), which 
provides all telecommunications services including wireless.  CVT is regulated by 
Direccao Geral das Comunicacoes, an agency in the Ministry of Infrastructure and 
Habitat.  Whereas the performance of CVT since partial privatization has improved 
substantially, Cape Verde has not been successful in promoting competition in 
wireless and Internet services. 
  The Cote d’Ivoire regulatory system includes two independent regulatory 
commissions.
45  The primary regulator is l’Agence des Télécommunications de 
Cote d’Ivoire.  The second regulator, the Conseil des Télécommunications de Côte 
d'Ivoire, oversees the primary regulator, and serves as a dispute mediator prior to 
formal legal appeals of the decisions of the primary regulator.  Although massively 
disrupted by civil war, the telecommunications regulatory framework in Cote 
d’Ivoire has managed to function during a period of political instability. 
  Gambia has taken only the first steps to reform by corporatizing its state-owned 
telecommunications provider, Gambia Telecommunications Company (Gamtel), by 
                                                 
43  Le Matinal, “Régulation des télécoms au Bénin : Un pas en avant, deux en arrière,” at 
www.quotidienlematinal.com/article.php3?id_article=2592. 
44 The organization and authority of ARTEL is described in 
www.delgi.gov.bf/Tic/R%C3%A9glementation/T%C3%A9l%C3%A9communication-Texte4.htm. 
45 Laffont, J-J, and T. N’Guessan. 2002. “Telecommunications Reform in Cote d’Ivoire”.   Policy Research 
Working Paper 2895.  World Bank.    44
allowing a second, private mobile telephone provider to compete with Gantel, and 
by establishing a multi-sector utility regulator, the Gambia Public Utilities 
Regulatory Authority.  The regulatory authority is independent, but its pricing 
authority is limited to “provide guidelines on rates and fees.”
46  In 2006, Gambia is 
considering a telecommunications bill that would liberalize the sector and 
strengthen the regulatory authority. 
  In Ghana, legislative reforms in 1996
47 created a regulatory agency, the National 
Communications Authority (NCA), that is not fully independent.  The Act allows 
the Minister of Communications to “give to the Authority such directions of a 
general character as appear to him to be in the public interest” (Part 1, Section 4).  
The NCA’s Board of Directors is appointed by the President and can be removed by 
the President at any time “for stated reasons” (Part 1, Section 6(2)).  One indicator 
of the lack of structural independence is the fact that until May 2003 the chair of the 
NCA Board was the Minister of Communications, and for much of the history of 
the NCA no other commissioners were appointed.  Because the government owns 
stakes in both fixed access carriers, a long distance carrier and the largest mobile 
carrier, the regulatory structure prevents the government from committing to a 
genuinely neutral regulatory environment for privately owned ICT firms.  Thus far 
the regulatory authority has been ineffective in resolving disputes in the sector, most 
of which have been resolved through ministerial intervention.  Spectrum 
management has been messy and overall enforcement has been weak.  For example, 
Ghana Telecom (GT) was prohibited to enter the mobile market, but it nevertheless 
offered mobile services, and other mobile operators were allowed to offer services 
without formal licenses.
48  In 2005, the government announced a sweeping new 
telecommunications policy framework that emphasizes privatization and 
competition, with plans to divest its ownership of telecommunications firms and to 
                                                 
46 The Gambia Public Utility Regulatory Authority Act, 2001, Part III, Section 13.(1)(a), at 
www.gda.gm/GAMBIA_PUBLIC_UTILITIES_REGULATORY_ACT.pdf. 
47 National Communications Authority Act, 1996, Law 524, Republic of Ghana, available at 
www.nca.org.gh/ncatemp/downloads/NCA%20ACT%20524.pdf. 
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license two more fixed service carriers and two new mobile carriers.
49  While the 
NCA now has a full complement of commissioners (with the Minister not among 
them), given the structural weaknesses of NCA, the credibility of the commitment 
to liberalization and competition is weak. 
  Guinea does not have an independent regulator.  La Direction Nationale des Postes 
et Telecommunications is an office within the Ministry of Communications, Post 
and Telecommunications.
50  Guinea has a poorly functioning telecommunications 
network, and has not made a clear commitment to liberalization.  The incumbent 
carrier, Société des Télécommunications de Guinée, has a statutory monopoly in 
fixed service and over 75 percent of the market in mobile telephony.  Partial 
privatization to Telekom Malaysia in 1995 failed when the private partner withdrew 
in 2005.
51 
  Guinea-Bissau is a very small country, one of the poorest nations in the world, and 
has one of the least developed telecommunications systems with around 12,000 
operating telephones.  The nation has established a telecommunications regulator, 
the Institute of Communications of Guinea-Bissau, and has adopted a legislative 
framework for liberalization.
52  A majority interest in the state-owned monopoly 
carrier was sold to Portuguese Telecommunications, but in 1998 the new owner 
abandoned the country in the midst of political instability. 
  Until recently, telecommunications regulation in Liberia was undertaken by an 
office within the Ministry of Communications, and policy favored the incumbent 
state-owned enterprise, the Liberia Telecommunications Corporation (LTC).   
Liberia announced a new liberalization policy in July 2005, and in September a 
statute was enacted that created an independent regulator, the Liberia 
Telecommunications Authority.
53  The first chair of the LTA was appointed by the 
                                                 
49 See Republic of Ghana, Ministry of Communications, National Telecommunications Policy at 
www.nca.org.gh/ncatemp/downloads/Ghana%20Telecom%20Policy%20Final.pdf. 
50 MBendi Information for Africa. 2000. “Guinea: Computers and Communications.” 
51 Trade Policy Review—Republic of Guinea, Report of the Secretariat, World Trade Organization, p. 73, at 
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52 See www.icgb.org/english/decree999.html. 
53 Republic of Liberia, National Telecommunications Strategy and Policy:  Telecommunications Sector Policy 
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provisional, transitional government in October 2005;  however, little progress has 
been made in reforming the sector owing to the nation’s political instability, and the 
LTA is not yet functioning.  LTC has operated only intermittently since mid-2005, 
and the newly elected government is attempting to revive the company by firing 
redundant employees and trying to attract foreign investment partners.
54  Because of 
Liberia’s long-term political instability and corruption, the new policy framework 
faces an uphill battle to attract significant investment. 
  Mali has a state-owned monopoly telecommunications carrier, Societé de 
Telecommunications du Mali (Somatel).  Although in 1998 the government 
announced its intention partially to privatize the company and liberalize the sector 
by the year 2000, this policy still has not been implemented.  The regulator is Le 
Comite de Regulation des Telecommunications, but its functions are primarily 
advisory to Le Ministère de la Communication et des Nouvelles Technologies de 
l'Information et de la Communication.  Mali has two wireless carriers, and despite 
continuing interconnection disputes the private carrier has attracted substantially 
more subscribers than Somatel’s affiliate, although overall mobile penetration 
remains low. 
  Although no longer a member of ECOWAS, Mauritania has been active in 
WATRA, and has done remarkably well during the past decade in modernizing its 
telecommunications industry, considering that the country has low population 
(around three million) and low population density.  In 1999, Mauritania enacted a 
comprehensive telecommunications law to guide the liberalization process, and 
shortly thereafter created a multisector independent regulator, Autorité de 
Régulation.  The former state-owned monopoly, Mauritania Telecommunications 
(Mauritel), was privatized in 2000.  A separate private wireless carrier was 
permitted to enter before Mauritel’s wireless subsidiary was licensed, and wireless 
telephone penetration is now approximately 20 percent of the total population. 
  In Niger, the regulator is Direction de la Réglementation des Télécommunications, 
which is an office of the Ministre de la communication et de la Culture.  The state-
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owned monopoly carrier, Société Nigérienne des Télécommunications, was 
partially privatized in 2001.  Subsequently, two additional mobile carriers have been 
permitted to enter;  however, penetration remains low. 
  In Nigeria, the National Telecommunications Commission (NCC) was created in 
1992.  The NCC operated like a bureau within the Ministry of Communications.  
From the appointment of its members to the exercise of its functions, the NCC was 
not intended to be a truly independent regulator.
55  In 2003 new legislation was 
passed that replaced the NCC with the Nigerian Communications Commission and 
redefined its role, powers and appointment process.
56  In its current form, the 
President appoints the nine members of the Board of Commissioners (Chapter II, 
Part 2, Section 5(2)), all of whom must be from one of an explicit list of professions 
that are relevant to telecommunications regulation (Chapter II, Part 2, Section 7(1)).  
The President is required to have at least six positions filled at all times (Chapter II, 
Part 2, Section 5(3)).  Commissioners have five year terms (Chapter II, Part 2, 
Section 8(4)), and can only be removed for cause, with the reasons for dismissal 
stated in writing with a right of formal reply (Chapter II, Part 2, Sections 10(1) – 
10(3)).  The law requires that the Minister of Communications consult the NCC 
about proposed policy changes, but guarantees the independence of the agency from 
the Ministry (Chapter III, Part 1, Sections 24-25).  The new NCC has a large, 
technically competent staff, many with advanced degrees.  The new regulatory 
framework is as good as any in Africa, but nations with many fewer technically 
educated civil servants would not be likely to replicate it. 
  Senegal has an independent regulator, l’Agence de Regulation des Telecoms (ART), 
which in December 2005 had postal regulation added to its portfolio and became 
l’Agence de Regulation des Telecoms et des Postes.  Art came into existence only 
after a protracted political battle.  Legislation to privatize the incumbent, state-
owned enterprise, Sonatel, was passed in 1996, but the creation of ART was delayed 
until a second law was passed in 2002,
57 due to opposition from Sonatel and its 
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employees unions.  In the interim the Ministry of Commerce served as the 
regulator.
58  In 2004, Sonatel lost its statutory monopoly, and since then Senegal’s 
telecommunications system has become one of the fastest growing and most 
competitive in Africa. 
  Sierra Leone has made slow progress in telecommunications reform due to more 
than a decade of civil war that only ended in 2002.  Since then, liberalization has 
been under way,
59 but other than the creation of a competitive wireless industry 
progress has been slow.  The sector is regulated by the Ministry of Transport and 
Communications and State Enterprises, and fixed access service is provided by a 
monopoly state-owned enterprise, Sierratel. 
  Togo’s regulator is Autorite de Reglementation des Secteurs de Postes et 
Telecommunications, which is an office with Le Ministre de l'Equipement, des 
Transports et des Postes et Télécommunications.  The body has limited authority, 
serving mostly as an adviser to the ministry on issues pertaining to competition and 
entry and as a mediator of disputes among service providers.
60  Although Togo has 
adopted a policy to liberalize telecommunications, the monopoly fixed access 
carrier, Société des Télécommunications du Togo, remains a state-owned enterprise.  
Togo has two wireless carriers, one private and one an affiliate of Togo Telecom.  In 
recent years Togo has suffered political instability that has inhibited its economic 
progress. 
The primary lesson from the recent history of telecommunications reforms is that 
within the ECOWAS region, progress towards reform varies widely as does the institutional 
commitment to a liberalized regime.  The leaders – the largest nations plus, among the 
smaller nations, Mauritania – provide both useful role models and a source of technical and 
legal expertise for the nations that have not progressed as far. 
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The Case for Regionalizing Regulatory Policy in West Africa 
The relevant market areas of the telecommunications industry, in general, are not 
coterminous with national borders.  Telecommunications operates more efficiently if its 
network is organized according to the patterns of its transactions.  In an open world 
economy, these patterns do not respect national geographic boundaries.  Given that 
telecommunications market boundaries transcend national borders, very little regulation 
in this sector has purely domestic effects.  International agreements about regulation and 
the creation of multinational regulatory authority would be natural vehicles to achieve 
regulatory harmonization and minimize the distortions that arise form national regulatory 
policies. 
In the West Africa region where many countries are small and poor and lack 
formal institutions and technical expertise, policy coordination, regulatory cooperation, 
and ultimately the creation of regional telecommunications regulatory authority might 
represent a pragmatic approach to dealing with the problem of limited domestic 
regulatory capacity.  Furthermore, multi-lateral regulatory agreements could advance 
domestic regulatory reform, enhance regulatory credibility, and help the ECOWAS 
countries overcome their commitment problems.  In each country, regulatory reform, 
especially when is debated one issue at a time, is frequently blocked by well-organized 
special interest groups.  If reform, on the other hand, becomes part of broader 
international policy that encompasses a whole range of issues, all interests are likely to 
participate, thus reducing the ability of a single group to block it.  Moreover, regulatory 
credibility is often undermined by political interference (that undermines independence) 
and opportunistic behavior on the part of the government.  It is much more difficult and 
costly for governments to behave opportunistically when regulatory policy is harmonized 
as part of a regional/international agreement, or to interfere in the decision process of a 
supra-national regulatory authority as opposed to national oversight.  The gains from 
regional cooperation may be large enough to discourage deviations from negotiated 
agreements. 
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International Regulatory Reform and Trade 
Until recently, the regulatory reform debate has been regarded primarily as an 
issue of domestic economic policy.  However, internationalization of regulatory reform is 
inevitable, and not just because the social and economic problems that give rise to 
regulation cross borders, as is emphasized by advocates of international environmental 
regulation.  Even without these cross-border problems, regulation inevitably is an 
international issue because, when other forms of trade barriers are low, regulations can 
distort trade.  
Regulatory distortions take two conceptually distinct forms: domestic and 
international. This conceptual division implies a prioritization scheme: focus international 
agreements on regulatory issues that cause significant international distortions. The 
inefficiencies of regulation that are purely domestic do not necessarily imply an 
international priority for reform. Whereas these effects are unfortunate, the costs mostly 
are confined to the country that causes them. If inefficient regulation has significant 
international repercussions, coordination and cooperation among nations in regulatory 
reform has the same status as multinational arrangements for reducing direct trade 
barriers. Mutuality in reform creates economic benefits that are broadly shared among 
domestic consumers and trading partners. 
As a practical matter, very little distorting regulation has purely domestic effects. 
International boundaries rarely define natural market barriers that cannot be crossed, and 
in most cases the most efficient organization of an industry is international. For example, 
infrastructural industries (energy utilities, communications, transportation, finance) all 
operate more efficiently if their networks are organized according to the pattern of 
transactions, and in a relatively open world economy, these patterns do not respect 
national borders. But even if markets are national or even local, entry by foreign firms 
can be an important source of price competition and productivity improvements. Even 
many segments of retail trade are more efficient if international chains of outlets and, of 
course, electronic commerce are permitted. Hence, both market access for foreign-made 
goods and openness to foreign investment promote economic growth, and regulations that 
prevent either create distortions of international significance. International agreements 
about regulation are the natural vehicle to eliminate these distortions.    51
An additional advantage of internationalizing regulatory reform is that it can be 
used to elevate the domestic political debate about regulation from narrowly 
particularistic issues to matters of national economic performance and international 
cooperation. From a political perspective, making regulatory reform an international issue 
is highly desirable. A common political barrier to domestic regulatory reform is that if 
reform is perceived as a domestic issue and is debated one issue at a time, well-organized 
special interests are more likely to have the political power to block it. For most specific 
regulatory issues, the beneficiaries of reform are numerous, but their per capita benefits 
are frequently too low or indirect to generate significant political pressure for reform. If 
the reform debate is elevated to a matter of international policy that encompasses 
numerous reform issues, broader attention and participation from all interests is more 
likely, thereby reducing the ability of a single interest to block reform. 
A useful analogy is the process of setting tariffs.  When each nation independently 
sets each tariff separately, the outcome is likely to be tariffs that are higher than the tariffs 
that would be negotiated bilaterally as part of a comprehensive trade agreement. The 
reason is that debating tariffs one product at a time maximizes the effect of the tendency 
for organized interests with a direct stake in a policy to be unduly influential. If a tariff on 
a specific product is under review, the domestic industry that produces the product is 
likely to be intensely interested and to exercise whatever political influence it has to 
obtain a policy decision favorable to itself; however, because the final price of the 
product is less important to each buyer than to each producer, the former are less likely to 
participate in the debate. Consequently, each important domestic industry may receive 
and preserve a tariff or a favorable regulation when policy is debated in a purely domestic 
context one industry at a time, but receive neither protective tariffs nor protective 
regulation when policy is developed multinationally and covers many industries. 
When each regulation is considered separately as a matter of domestic policy 
within a specialized agency, the government is likely to be under less pressure to adopt an 
efficient policy. If a regulation imposes unnecessary costs uniformly on firms in a 
domestic industry, sales of the industry’s product may be suppressed, some by higher 
prices, but the individual firms are unlikely to suffer very much because none is being 
disadvantaged relative to a competitor. If international trade threatens the industry,    52
however, the industry will energetically seek relief. The politically expedient move may 
be to inhibit trade competition, either by using regulation as an indirect trade barrier or by 
banning trade while invoking a rhetorical attack on the lax standards of a trading partner. 
This approach placates the regulated industry and the other interests that place high value 
on the regulatory policy. The primary organized harmed interest, foreign producers, is 
more easily ignored because they do not participate in domestic politics. 
Just as simultaneous negotiations over tariffs on all products facilitate reaching 
agreements that provide freer trade, so, too, does simultaneous negotiation of numerous 
areas of regulation facilitate eliminating regulatory indirect trade barriers.  As with tariffs, 
the inclusion of multiple regulatory policies within the same negotiation creates more 
opportunities and more mutually beneficial bargains to reduce distortions simultaneously 
on all fronts.  Thus, the incorporation of regulation into trade agreements should follow 
the same principles that have been generally followed with respect to tariffs and quotas. 
Specifically, if regulatory policy is part of an international agreement, it must reduce, not 
increase, distortions in the international economy and extend, not contract, the extent of 
liberalization. Introducing regulation into single-product negotiations is prone to lead to 
increased trade distortions (by using regulation to inhibit trade). In particular, 
negotiations about a single product or area of regulation run the risk of creating an 
alliance between protectionists and the most ardent advocates of a particular regulatory 
policy who seek regulations that go far beyond those that maximize net social benefits. 
The same argument applies to the enforcement of agreements not to adopt 
anticompetitive regulations. If enforcement powers reside solely in domestic agencies, a 
case in which a regulation disadvantages foreign producers rests on unbalanced 
underlying politics.  Domestic producers are likely to be more effectively represented 
than foreigners in the agency and the background political system in which the agency 
must operate. Consequently, actions to eliminate the anticompetitive international effects 
of regulation are likely to face more political resistance than support. 
International institutions for resolving regulatory trade disputes operate in a more 
balanced political environment. These institutions can be a means through which nations 
mutually can commit to maintain procompetitive regulatory reforms. The GATT and 
WTO disputes about automobile fuel efficiency and reformulated gasoline illustrate how    53
domestic regulatory agencies but not international institutions are willing to sacrifice 
competition as well as some of the effectiveness of regulatory policies in order to 
advantage domestic producers. 
For these reasons, internationalization of regulatory reform can succeed by 
enfranchising foreign producers in domestic regulatory policy across a spectrum of 
industries. In the context of a dispute about the trade effects of a particular regulation, 
intervention by an international organization frequently is met with cries of outrage — an 
intervention by foreigners into domestic policy. All international agreements entail some 
loss of the ability to act independently in order to achieve something else of value, which 
in this case is a worldwide regulatory system that is more efficient and freer of trade 
distortions. Such an institution generates net economic benefits to each country, even if 
some cases create some domestic losers. The creation of institutions for enforcing 
agreements to eliminate indirect trade barriers is a means to balance the political 
influence of these domestic losers. 
The growing movement for regulatory reform throughout the world has increased 
the potential significance of internationalizing the reform process. If some nations are 
operating a relatively efficient regulatory system while others are not, international cost 
differences arising from regulation are likely to surface as political issues in high-cost 
countries. Perhaps the result will be reform, but another plausible scenario is protection 
against “unfair” competition. Initiating multisectoral international negotiations over 
phased reform offers the opportunity to seize the initiative, casting the agenda in terms of 
improved efficiency rather than retaliation against unfair trade. Domestic reforms that 
enfranchises competition policy agencies facilitates free trade by promoting reforms of 
regulatory policies that erect entry barriers. Reforms that impose mandatory benefit-cost 
analysis facilitate free trade by creating a stronger information base to challenge 
regulatory trade barriers in international dispute resolution institutions. Finally, designing 
these same dispute resolution entities to incorporate the principles of competition policy 
and economic policy analysis has two potential benefits: identifying regulations that have 
no plausible rationale other than to disadvantage foreign competition, and, beyond this, 
reducing the degree to which differences in regulatory policy creates differential 
regulatory efficiency. Both effects of the internationalization of regulatory reform serve    54
the objectives of international openness and help to eliminate an important source of 
distortions in the international economy. 
    55
V. Harmonization  of  Regulatory Frameworks in ECOWAS 
 
Obtaining consensus from all governments in a given region for full-fledged 
regulatory harmonization and a regional regulatory authority is problematic because of 
differences in the attitudes and commitment towards reform, and concerns about national 
sovereignty.  However, such a consensus will gradually occur as more countries reform, 
the gains from regional policy coordination and trade become more apparent, and 
especially the small countries are confronted with the costs and staffing realities of 
setting up and running national regulatory bodies. 
 
Spectrum of Harmonization Models 
Regional harmonization is not a binary variable.  It entails a wide range of policy 
options that lie between complete national autonomy and full integration (figure 2).  At 
one extreme, the members of the community surrender their sovereignty on regulatory 
and other policy decisions to a regional regulatory authority (RRA).  At the other 
extreme, the national regulatory authorities (NRAs) retain full jurisdiction over all areas 
of regulatory policy and decision-making, with the RRA’s role limited to disseminating 
information, issuing non-binding guidelines, and acting as a source of centralized 
technical expertise. 
Figure 2   Harmonization Models 
Source: Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu (2003).
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Centralized Harmonization 
Under full, centralized harmonization, the RRA has the statutory authority  to 
make policy determinations that are binding on the member states.  Moreover the RRA 
has the legal power and framework to enforce those decisions and to impose penalties in 
the event of non-compliance by the member states.  Thus, the RRA would have the 
authority to: 
  Regulate end-user prices and impose quality of service obligations on all licensed 
telecommunications operators in the community, with penalties attached for non-
compliance 
  Regulate the terms and conditions of interconnection and access to bottleneck 
telecommunications facilities, and intervene to resolve interconnection disputes 
  Manage and allocate all aspects of the frequency spectrum in the ECOWAS 
territory 
  Issue licenses for all telecommunications services throughout the community. 
  Pre-empt local and national rules regarding rights of way 
  Collect and disburse funds to support universal service and other social goals in 
the telecommunications sector 
  Represent the community in international organizations 
Under central harmonization the NRAs would have no independent policy-
making authority.  Instead, their role would be limited to providing an input into the 
consultative process of the RRA, supply data on national market conditions, and advise 
on implementation issues. 
The centralized harmonization model treats the entire ECOWAS region as a 
single economic space and as such if offers the greatest opportunity to exploit regional 
economies of scale in the telecommunications industry.  It also holds the promise of 
lowering the cost of doing business in the region by reducing the administrative barriers 
and regulatory costs of entry (e.g. by facilitating access to the necessary licenses and 
permits through “one-stop shopping”).  The creation of a supra-national regulatory 
authority raises, on the other hand, proper concerns about accountability and the need for 
checks and balances on the powers of such authority.    57
Separated Jurisdiction  
Under separated jurisdiction, the RRA is charged with regulating 
telecommunications transactions between the member states and represent the region in 
international forums while the NRAs have full regulatory authority over 
telecommunications transactions and services that do not cross national boundaries.  This 
model roughly corresponds to US system of dual state and federal regulation over 
telephone service where the Federal Communications Commission has jurisdiction over 
interstate telecommunications transactions and the state public service commissions have 
authority over all intrastate services. 
 
Centralized Policy/National Implementation 
Under this model, the RRA issues binding regulatory and other policy directives 
which are then adopted by the member states and converted into national law.  The NRAs 
have the full responsibility to implement and enforce these directives.  Thus, each 
member state retains its sovereignty over regulatory matters but it is obligated to 
implement its national policies in accordance with the overall policy recommendations 
and directives issued by the center. 
In this model, the RRA acts as a policy-making body that establishes regional 
policy through a consultative process.  It is very similar to the one adopted by the 
European Union where the Commission formulates policy and issues directives that have 
the force of European law.  But it is the responsibility of the member states to adopt the 
directives into national laws and regulations and thus to establish and implement national 
regulation. 
This model treats the entire ECOWAS region as a single economic space while at 
the same time it recognizes the importance of national sovereignty and the reality of 
significant cross country differences in institutional endowments and legal structures, 
traditions and processes.  The practical outcome of this compromise between maintaining 
national sovereignty and pursuing regional policy harmonization is likely to be the 
uneven adoption and implementation by the member states of policies developed by the 
regional authority.  Inevitably, some member states will be slow and reluctant to 
implement the RRA directives into national laws and regulations.     58
 
Decentralized Harmonization 
Under this model, the RRA acts as a central source of technical expertise, 
undertakes regional and benchmarking policy studies, facilitates information exchange, 
publishes reference papers that summarize the emerging international experience on 
important policy issues, and organizes regional training programs.  The RRA has no 
regulatory authority but it can issue non-binding regulatory and other policy guidelines.  
While this model, at least in the early stages of regional integration, represents the 
most realistic organizational option, it offers very little assurance that uniform and 
consistent regulatory policies will be effectively implemented across the region.  Thus, 
trade distortions created by differences in regulatory efficiency among the ECOWAS 
countries are likely to persist. 
  
 
The West African Telecommunications Regulators Association  
The West African Telecommunications Regulatory Association (WATRA) is an 
association of Regulators and the respective responsible Government Ministries of West 
Africa Territories. WATRA aims to co-ordinate dialogue of telecommunications policy 
and regulations in the region. The objectives of the association are to: 
  Encourage the establishment of modern legal and regulatory structures for 
telecommunications service delivery in all States in the sub-region; and to 
encourage the separation of the roles of policy-maker, regulator and licensed 
operator/service provider, and the establishment of distinct, independent and 
adequately empowered National telecommunications regulatory agencies in 
countries in the sub-region where such agencies have not been created 
  Seek the development and harmonization of regulations for telecommunications 
service delivery and pricing in countries in the sub-region 
  Promote the establishment and operation of efficient, adequate, and cost-effective 
telecommunications networks and services in the West African sub-region which 
meet the diverse needs of customers while being economically sustainable    59
  Encourage increased liberalization and competition initiatives in networks 
development and to enhance efficiency in telecommunications service delivery in 
the sub-region 
  Contribute to the development of policies to enhance universal access and   
telecommunication penetration in rural and under-served areas in the sub-region 
  Facilitate the exchange of ideas, views and experiences among members on all 
aspects of regulation of the telecommunications sector 
  Conceptualize and formulate for eventual recommendation to policy makers in the 
sub-region, an information and communications technology master-plan which 
will set policy objectives and milestones for the modernization of 
telecommunications infrastructures and service delivery in the sub-region 
  Contribute, through the progressive integration of regulatory mechanisms, 
towards sub-regional market integration in the telecommunications sector, leading 
eventually to integration of the continental African market 
  Work towards the attainment of a uniform telecommunications service standard in 
the sub-region, and the adoption of uniform technical and quality standards for 
telecommunication applications and equipment employed in the sub-region 
  Contribute to human resource and capacity building efforts aimed at redressing 
the shortage of indigenous skills, competencies and capabilities in emerging 
information and communications technologies in the sub-region; 
  Collaborate and co-operate with the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) towards the attainment of its treaty objectives of sub-regional 
economic and social integration, as envisaged in the ECOWAS Treaty of 1975, 
especially in Chapter VIII of the Treaty, with particular reference to Articles 40 
and 45 thereof, and in various ECOWAS protocols 
  Collaborate and co-operate with the African Telecommunications Union (ATU) 
towards the attainment of its stated mission of promoting rapid development of 
info-communications in Africa to achieve universal access to basic 
telecommunications and full inter-country connectivity in Africa; and the 
fulfillment of its objectives, especially the objective of promoting the    60
development and adoption of appropriate African telecommunications policy and 
regulatory frameworks 
  Collaborate and co-operate with the International Telecommunications Union 
(ITU) towards the attainment of its agenda for global telecommunications 
development, especially with respect to its initiatives for the development of 
regional and sub-regional structures for more effective telecommunications 
service delivery 
  Collaborate and co-operate with any other regional or international body or 
institution whose objectives or activities may facilitate or enhance the attainment 
of WATRA’s aims and objectives 
In furtherance of these objectives WATRA may: 
  Deliberate on issues relating to telecommunications regulation and make 
necessary recommendations to the respective governments of members or other 
appropriate authorities, or take any other appropriate action 
  Collaborate with, or participate as a consultative or associate member, or in any 
other appropriate capacity, in the activities of any organisation, institution or body 
whose objectives involve the regulation of telecommunications, particularly, the 
Telecommunications Regulatory Associations of other African sub-regional 
economic blocs, as well as other international organizations and public and 
private initiatives involved with or interested in the development and 
modernization of the structures for telecommunications service delivery in Africa 
  Co-ordinate the utilization of scarce resources in areas of telecommunications 
regulation and enhance co-operation among members through the joint use of 
specialized facilities 
  Take any other action and adopt any other measure as it may deem necessary or 
desirable for the achievement of its objectives. 
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Figure 3  Spectrum of Harmonization Models:  Where Does ECOWAS Stand? 




Thus, WATRA is primarily a consultative body.  It can formulate common 
regional policy objectives and issue non-binding guidelines to the NRAs on regulatory 
and technical issues.  However, the member states will retain final authority over policy 
implementation.  Thus, the institutional structure of WATRA is closest to the 
decentralized harmonization model (figure 3).
63  Still, WATRA could exercise 
considerable influence over regional regulatory policy and make a substantive 
contribution towards regulatory harmonization by aggregating relevant data and case 
experience, facilitating cross border benchmarking, and developing mechanisms for 
regional consultation and consensus building.  Such consultative mechanisms could 
encourage the active participation of NRAs, operators and potential investors in 
formulating future regulatory policies and thus assist in achieving more uniform and 
consistent regulatory policies at the regional level. 
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WATRA--An Agenda for Action 
The conventional wisdom has long been that the key to success in reforming and 
opening up telecommunications markets to competition is to establish independent 
regulatory bodies along the lines of the FCC in the United States, Ofcom in the United 
Kingdom, the CRTC in Canada, and the Authotite de Regulation des 
Telecommunications in France.  Determined efforts by international organizations like 
the ITU and the World Bank have encouraged development of new regulatory 
mechanisms to oversee the telecommunications.  However, like in almost all other 
developing countries, regulatory efforts in the ECOWAS region have mostly focused on 
institution building: writing enabling legislation, defining organizational architecture, 
determining administrative procedures, identifying sources of funding, and so on. Not 
enough attention has been paid to the substantive content of regulatory governance—i.e. 
the issues that require regulatory resolution and the related economic, accounting, legal, 
and engineering expertise. The scarcity of such skills will be one of the main 
impediments to effective regulation in the most of the countries in the region.  Indeed, the 
requisite expertise in such critical areas as cost modeling and accounting to evaluate 
pricing proposals and tariff rebalancing schemes is generally lacking throughout the 
ECOWAS region.  The resolution of access and interconnection disputes is another areas 
of regulation that requires substantial engineering, economic, accounting, and financial 
expertise. 
WATRA could play a very important role in reducing the regional risk of 
regulatory failure due to the lack of technical and economic expertise in critical areas by: 
encouraging the design of effective and practical regulatory regimes in the member 
states; identifying less sophisticated regulatory instruments that do not impose significant 
informational and analytical requirements on the NRAs; undertaking benchmarking and 
other studies on important areas of policy and disseminating the findings of those studies 
through the publication of reference papers and technical guidelines; designing training 
programs for the staffs of the NRAs. 
Thus, WATRA is faced with the urgent need to:    63
  Identify the substantive regulatory issues that are likely to arise in the member 
states that are implementing restructuring and privatization programs in 
telecommunicatios (e.g. the pricing of access to bottleneck network facilities, 
reducing rigidities and inefficiencies in retail tariff structures, competitively 
neutral mechanisms for funding universal service mandates), and suggest 
strategies for addressing these issues 
  Deepen the regional understanding of how to design effective and practical 
regulatory mechanisms in the face of scarce technical and economic expertise 
  Evaluate the efficacy of the new regulatory principles that have emerged in the 
last decade stipulating a preference for competition and reliance on market-like 
solutions and assess their applicability to the unique circumstances of the 
ECOWAS member states-- in particular the consequences of unstable 
macroeconomic conditions and imperfectly developed capital markets for the 
pace and extent of appropriate regulatory decontrol 
  Identify options for the structural reorganization of industries that reduce the need 
for regulatory oversight 
  Develop more precise criteria distinguishing between cases where regulatory 
intervention is required and those where it is not 
  Develop models for optimal allocation of scarce regulatory resources among firms 
and sectors with different sizes, technologies, information asymmetries, and 
political constraints 
  Identify appropriate, perhaps less sophisticated, tools of intervention better suited 
to regulators in the ECOWAS region 
  Identify the fundamental principles that must be articulated publicly by the NRAs 
as the basis for their policy analysis and regulatory decisions—e.g., commitment 
to the financial interests of investors at the baseline level established by the terms 
of privatization; reliance on the workings of the market wherever there is or could 
be reasonably effective competition; weigh the cost of rules against the benefits; 
allow open access to bottlenecks on terms that reflect competitive parity; assure 
service quality and price levels that are consistent with the competitive standard; 
provision of economically efficient signals and incentives to final consumers, to    64
suppliers of complementary and substitute services, to upstream suppliers, and to 
investors. 
 
Rules Governing Access to Bottlenecks 
One of the most vexing and important tasks facing regulators in ECOWAS is to 
design the terms and conditions of access to “bottleneck” telecommunications facilities 
by competing service providers.  These are facilities that are essential inputs in the 
delivery of final services and it would be uneconomic to duplicate them.  The most 
outstanding example of such a bottleneck in telecommunications is the local loop (“final 
mile”).  Access policy is the keystone of the contemporary response to the problem of 
residual monopoly in telecommunications.  Indeed, it is at the forefront of discussion of 
means to facilitate competitive entry into activities that have traditionally been run by 
franchised monopolies. 
The Goals of Access Policy.  With the progressive introduction of competition 
into the telecommunications industry, a greater number of rival firms will seek to 
interconnect to its networks than in the past.  At each interconnection point, an access 
price will have to be determined.  The terms of access should not distort the process by 
which prices are adapted to consumer preferences and demands for services.  Prices 
should be sufficiently high to be compensatory (at least cover the long-run incremental 
cost of the use of the network by the entrant), yet not so high as to preclude efficient 
operations by the entrant.  Regulation should, therefore, ensure that there is sufficient 
pressure on the owner of the infrastructure to operate in an efficient manner, but that no 
unnecessary duplication of network construction takes place. 
One fundamental goal of access policy is competitive parity-- that is to ensure that 
competition in the final product market is efficient and not tilted to favor either the owner 
of the bottleneck facility or its actual and potential rivals. Rules consistent with the 
principle of competitive parity should generally lead to a distribution of responsibility for 
performing the contested activity among the competing rivals on the basis of their 
relative efficiency and so minimize the total cost of supplying the final service.  If the 
bottleneck input is priced in such a way that sales of the final product are diverted to a 
supplier that incurs in the process real costs higher than that would be incurred by a rival,    65
then the result is surely inefficient.  Such inefficiency will clearly occur whenever the 
prospective supplier who incurs the lower real incremental cost in producing the final 
service cannot afford to charge as low as that of a rival with a higher incremental cost of 
supplying the service in question. 
There are two necessary conditions for competitive parity.  First, there must be no 
discrimination, overt or implicit, between the division or affiliate of the company 
controlling the bottleneck facility and its rivals that are seeking access to it.  Such 
discrimination may arise in the price, quality, and other terms and conditions of access 
supply.  Second, the margin between the wholesale access charge imposed by the owner 
of the bottleneck, which its rivals must pay, and it final retail price, against which its 
rivals must compete, must reflect the former’s economic costs of performing the 
contested supply function.  These requirements for competitive parity reduce to two 
specific pricing rules:  i) the owner of the bottleneck must charge itself the same access or 
interconnection charges as it imposes on its competitors, except to the extent that the 
marginal costs of providing that service to itself and to its competitors differ; and ii) the 
price charged for the final product by the bottleneck owner must recover both the access 
charge and the incremental cost of its own retail operations. 
In today's fast changing technological and marketing environment in 
telecommunications, it is difficult to predict what collection of basic network elements 
will prove to be essential to the efficient provision of some desired service by some 
supplier.  As such, the opportunities for competition to work effectively and to bring 
innovative offerings to consumers would be enhanced by the availability on an unbundled 
and non-discriminatory basis of any basic network element, or any collection of 
functions, that is needed by the entrant. 
Why the Issue Is Difficult.  The access issue is especially vexing in situations 
where several firms compete in the sale of a final product, but one of these firms is the 
monopoly owner of an input that is indispensable in the supply of that product.  The 
problem is how competition in the final product market can be preserved and not tilted to 
favor either the owner of the bottleneck input or its rivals.  The answer, in principle, is 
that the input should be made available to all competitors, including the bottleneck 
owner, on a "fair and equal basis".  However, if the bottleneck owner has strong    66
incentives to keep other entities out, it is unclear how effective such "equal access" 
mandates are likely to be.  The telecommunications industries in ECOWAS have already 
seen many disputes with claims of "unfair" and "unreasonable" exclusion from essential 
facilities controlled by incumbent monopolists. 
In a variety of market settings, monopoly control of bottleneck facilities can 
create irresistible incentives to behave anticompetitively and to cross-subsidize 
unregulated competitive activities from regulated monopoly ones.  Without regulatory 
constraint, the holder of the bottleneck monopoly could repress competition by creating 
artificial handicaps for its rivals in the market for the final products sold to consumers.  
The monopolist can impose costs on its competitors by impeding their access to the 
bottleneck, thereby raising the prices that they must charge to cover their elevated costs, 
and thus weakening their ability to compete. 
It is clear that if structural and other circumstances permit the owner of the 
bottleneck input to engage in anticompetitive leveraging of market power from the "input 
market" to the "final product market", then the bottleneck monopolist would have 
incentives to exclude other participants in order to gain additional market power and 
concomitant incremental monopoly profits.  Likewise, under classic rate-of-return 
regulation the owner of the bottleneck would have incentives to undermine or avoid 
efficient cooperation with rivals in order to enlarge the portion of services it provides 
since additional output of end-user services would justify additional capital stock.   
Moreover, the bottleneck monopolist would be motivated to exclude an efficient 
participant if by doing so it would weaken, in a predatory manner, the competitive 
pressure exerted by that participant in another market that is related to the regulated 
market at issue by important economies of scope. 
Basic Methodological Approaches to Access Prices.  A variety of different methods for 
setting access prices have been proposed in the economic literature. Those can be roughly 
divided along two key dimensions. The first dimension pertains to the institutional setting 
in which access rates are determined. In particular, access rates can be set directly by the 
regulator (i.e., determined by an independent body according to some well-defined and 
transparent set of rules) or, voluntarily negotiated by the parties (subject to some general 
legal principles, such as competition laws that guard against "abuse” of dominance).    67
There are very few, if any, countries in which there are no regulatory or antitrust 
constraints on the terms on which access can be obtained. This makes perfect sense in 
view of the fact that there is little or no competition in the provision of access.  Until such 
competition develops at the workable level, so that market forces can be relied to keep 
access rates at competitive levels, there have to be some other means for ensuring that 
access is not denied or priced excessively.  However, it also follows that once a workably 
competitive market in the provision of access develops, regulatory strictures on the 
pricing of access will not be required.   
The second dimension pertains to whether access rates are build up from costs 
(the "bottom up" approach ) or derived from end-user prices (the "top down" approach) 
of services that have "access" as an input. Both methods have been used in practice. 
Neither one is unambiguously superior to the other as a practical tool for setting access 
rates.  It is commonly agreed, however, that the top-down approach provides a tool for 
gauging whether or not the seller of the access deals with itself on preferential basis.  It is 
also important to note that neither regulation nor negotiation is unambiguously superior  
to one another. Regulation may be desirable in those countries in which antitrust laws are 
poorly developed or non-existent and in which competition policy agency (and the 
courts) may lack the required expertise to resolve disputes regarding access. On the other 
hand, regulatory agency may be captured by the incumbent (or may be even potential 
entrants) and pursue access polices that are not necessarily in the public interest. In sum, 
from the policy perspective, there is not a single method that can be recommended as the 
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Box 2    Interconnection Disputes in West Africa 
 
Nigeria—NITEL’s  arbitrary and anti-competitive conduct? 
 
Industry experience confirms that NITEL has been left with a free hand to arbitrarily impose 
interconnection charges on other operators without intervention or comment by the National 
Regulatory Authority (NCC).  Interconnection terms and conditions are casually offered to 
private operators on a “take it or leave it” basis, and at least one private operator has been 
arbitrarily disconnected from NITEL’s network for allegedly breaching those terms.  Other 
operators have been denied interconnection for various unverifiable reasons (e.g. the supposed 
absence of E1 Channels), or have been arbitrarily restricted to a single location for the 
establishment of points of interconnection.  One of the leading GSM operators implicated yet 
another factor on the question of high tariffs, this time blaming the unfair interconnection 
charges imposed upon it by NITEL.  The operator emphasized that interconnection with 
NITEL on fair and reasonable terms must be considered the most significant challenge facing 
the company today, and it wondered why the NCC appeared unwilling to intervene. 
 
Ghana—Spacefon accuses Ghana Telecom of misleading information on 
interconnectivity 
 
The impasse between Ghana Telecom (GT) and Spacefon over interconnectivity rates took 
another twist last week when the latter accused GT of misleading the public with wrong 
information. Addressing a press conference in Accra, the Managing Director (MD) of 
Spacefon, Ahmad Farroukh, said GT wanted to increase its service charges, but instead of 
explaining to the public the factors that have necessitated the increase, it rather sought to put 
the blame of its past and future losses on mobile phone operators and the National 
Communication Authority (NCA).  He said for the past three months, GT management has 
sought to deceive the public through the media by presenting wrong information, and only last 
week incited GT union workers, who threatened to take the unlawful action of suppressing 
traffic flow from GT to Spacefon network.  Mr. Farroukh said according to international 
standards and NCA regulations, interconnectivity between networks was a must, as it was the 
essential right of the consumer to make and receive calls to and from any network. He said, "It 
is very important to understand that the cost per minute for a mobile subscriber is far higher 
than that of a fixed one because of the different technology and the amount of capital 
expenditure involved in operating them.  The MD accused GT of intentionally twisting the 
facts about the traffic imbalance between GT and mobile operators "to portray the picture of a 
company that is bleeding operationally and financially" from the low payment of rates of 





The economic literature offers two major approaches to the efficient pricing of 
essential facilities: the Efficient Component Pricing Rule (ECPR) or Parity Pricing, and 
the Ramsey Pricing Rule.  Efficient component pricing is the name that has been given to    69
the principle that the holder of the bottleneck facility should offer its services at a price 
that yields it the same contribution that it would earn from performing the end-user 
service itself.  ECPR is consistent with efficient competition--it ensures that the 
responsibility for supplying the contested services is distributed among actual and 
potential rivals in such a way as to minimize total costs.  However, ECPR does not in 
itself permit competition to fulfill its other important functions of eliminating allocative 
inefficiency and eroding monopoly profits--the ultimate determination of how large a 
markup of the retail price above marginal cost is economically efficient, and therefore 
what level of contribution should correspondingly be incorporated in access charges, 
must be correctly supplied by regulation.  This requirement is likely to be substantially 
violated in most of our client countries with deficient regulatory mechanisms where the 
regulator-imposed price structures are frequently inefficient. 
The Ramsey Pricing Rule recognizes the fact that the profit of the integrated 
incumbent is an increasing function of both the access charge and the final retail price.  
Under a break even constraint, a higher access charge would permit the regulated firm to 
lower its final price.  A regulator concerned with consumer welfare would take this trade 
off explicitly into account.  The socially optimal level of the access charge will depend on 
the benefits of reducing the retail price (which will depend on the elasticity of demand) 
and the effects of raising the access charge on productive inefficiency (which will depend 
on the entrants). 
Despite their internal consistency and powerful theoretical results, the translation 
of either approaches into workable rules and actual access pricing schedules for the 
guidance of regulators and their accountants and engineers has been proven to be an 
extraordinarily difficult and contentious task.  The first approach suffers from very 
restrictive assumptions that limit significantly its applied policy content.  Indeed, the case 
for adopting ECPR is not so unequivocal when allocative and dynamic efficiency are 
important issues, as is likely to be the case in many of the  ECOWAS countries--i.e., 
when even inefficient competition could make a substantial contribution to allocative 
efficiency and to stimulating improvements in efficiency and service innovation.  The 
second approach has such formidable informational requirements (demand and supply    70
elasticities are generally very difficult to estimate in practice) that its translation into 
operational rules than can be applied in real world settings is almost impossible. 
An important and urgent task for WATRA would be to undertake a study with the 
substantive objectives to: (i) summarize the existing theory of access pricing and the 
practical issues in implementing access pricing in the telecommunications industries of 
the region; (ii) translate the principles and results of the theoretical and analytic work on 
interconnection and access into a set of tractable and workable rules and procedures, 
especially in the face of severe measurement problems with respect to the relevant 
economic variables; and (iii) identify the conditions under which, if any, it is appropriate 
to use access pricing as an instrument for the promotion of supplementary goals (e.g. the 
promotion of competition) that go beyond the attainment of economic efficiency.  
 
Tariff Rebalancing 
One of the most urgent tasks for policy towards the telecommunications industries 
in West Africa is to redress historic tariff imbalances which have generally resulted in 
local tariffs being low and long-distance (especially international) tariffs being too high.  
Raising local tariffs does not appear politically expedient.  The real difficulty facing 
telecom sector authorities and the incumbent dominant operators is how to put the issues 
of price reform and rebalancing on the larger political agenda in the face of weak 
economies.  Still, the experience of countries that have been restructuring their telecom 
sectors strongly suggests that repricing local services is imperative. 
Distorted telephone rates impose significant costs on an economy by providing  
wrong economic signals to the users of the telephone network.  Low rates for local 
calling over-stimulate local usage while long-distance calling is inefficiently repressed 
because of excessive rates.  In addition, unbalanced rates create incentives for 
uneconomic bypass. 
One of the consequences of liberalization and deregulation around the world has 
been the reduction of interexchange and international tariffs.  Maintaining these tariffs at 
traditional levels places national telecom users at a competitive disadvantage in an 
increasingly globalized economy.  The efficiency of telecom pricing may often be a 
determining factor in foreign investors’ decisions about where to locate plants, as well as    71
service industries dependent on computer processing capabilities.  This is especially 
important in the case of the ECOWAS countries given their critical need for foreign 
direct investment. 
Another reason for moving promptly to adjust tariff structures is that both 
collection and settlement rates for international services are steadily being reduced as a 
result of pressures in the international arena.  Such services have traditionally contributed 
a disproportionately high percentage of operators’ profits.  Failure to put in place new 
tariff structures to offset anticipated lost international revenues could place the operators 
at a serious disadvantage. 
In the face of the telecommunications sectors’ significant investment 
requirements, the operating entities should also be accorded substantial competitive 
pricing flexibility.  The efficient defraying of these large infrastructure costs will require 
prices that are based on both cost and demand conditions--demand considerations as well 
as cost data must be permitted to enter into the determination of rates in order to permit 
adequacy of revenues and achieve efficiency.  In particular, the operators should be 
permitted to identify means of increasing local tariffs on a selective basis.  For example, 
if an overlay network of new digital facilities is implemented, users of these new 
facilities might be expected to pay local exchange charges that approximate the 
international levels. 
 
Mechanisms to Fund the Sector’s Social Goals 
Traditional regulation has, in many domains, led to prices with systematic 
elements of cross-subsidization.  However, both economic theory and regulatory 
experience suggest that it is impossible to maintain significant cross-subsidies in the 
structure of prices for long, with open entry and no remedial policies, whether or not that 
would seem to policy-makers to be desirable.  Therefore, with market liberalization, 
either new sources of subsidy must be found, or rates that were below incremental costs 
must be raised to compensatory levels. 
In the United States, following the deregulation of key sectors of the economy, a 
substantial amount of effort was put into the design of competitively neutral mechanisms 
to foster desirable social goals and positive economic externalities.  The need to adopt    72
support mechanisms that are explicit and sufficient to advance certain publicly articulated 
universal service principles, and to assist consumers who would otherwise be 
disadvantaged, is even more pronounced in our client countries that are liberalizing key 
sectors of their economies. 
The experience from the United States contains important lessons.  However, in 
the context of a specific industry in a given country, the requisite policy approach for 
pursuing universal service goals is likely to be sensitive to the country's political and 
institutional endowment, its fiscal condition, consumer incomes and preferences, as well 
as the industry's economic characteristics.  Additional work is needed to understand how 
these factors affect the optimal design of support mechanisms in the ECOWAS region: 
whether support for universal service should be funded out of general tax revenues, or 
perhaps out of a broadly-based tax on revenues derived from the industry's products and 
services; the extent and scope of subsidies; and methods for delivering the subsidy 
without distorting competition.     73
Annex A  
West Africa Telecommunications—Country Summaries 
 
1.  Benin 
General 
Benin had an old style posts and telecommunications entity until 2004, when the Office 
des Postes et Telecommunications (OPT), was separated in two companies: Benin 
Telecom, and Benin Post Office
64.  The separation paved the way for the privatization of 
the national incumbent, which, however, has not been implemented yet.  Some progress 
has been made in the mobile industry were there are now four private mobile operators, 
whose combined connections exceed fixed lines by more than 5:1
65.  The fixed-line 




National teledensity is among the lowest in Africa.  The state operator covers 75-80% of 
the country and 36% of the telephone lines are located in the main cities.  The waiting 




In 2000 the mobile sector was liberalized and three licenses were issued to Telecel Benin 
and Spacetel-Benin and Libercom (OPT).  Since, the launching of the GSM networks the 
number of mobile subscribers has grown considerably, a trend that is evident in most 
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Regulation 
In 1999 the government adopted a strategy of reform to open the market to competition 
and allow for privatization of OPT.  In 2002 two laws came into effect that established a 
regulatory authority (Autorite de Regulation des Postes et Telecommunications – Decree 
2002-003) and created a legal framework for interconnection and tariff policy (Decree 
2002-002)
69.  In October 2003, the council of ministers adopted a decree establishing a 
regulatory body
70.  According to a report on businessafrica.net, the government of Benin 
has suspended the Posts and Telecommunications Regulatory Authority in early May this 
year.  The government also abrogated all texts of the decrees that mandated the authority 
and announced that it will review all existing licenses as well as the contracts between 
Benin Telecoms and private operators. 
 
Liberalization 
According to the 2002 decree, telecommunications services in Benin should be 
liberalized by December 31, 2005
71.  Some progress has been made with the separation of 
OPT but more substantial steps have been made in the mobile sector, which was 
liberalized in 2000 when three GSM licenses were issued. 
 
Privatization  
The privatization process in the telecommunications sector of Benin began with the 
separation of OPT in two entities.  The approval of a strategy for the privatization of 
Benin Telecom and the issue of an invitation to bid was supposed to be implemented by 
the end of 2005.  However, this deadline has not been met and the process has stalled
72. 
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2.  Burkina Faso 
General 
Burkina Faso’s telecom sector is undergoing transformation with the planned 
privatization of the national operator (Onatel) and the end of the company’s monopoly in 
fixed lines on December 2005. 
Fixed-line teledensity is among the lowest in Africa with only 0.74 telephone lines per 
100 inhabitants, while mobile penetration is 4.33% (2005).  Moreover, 81% of the 
telephone lines are in the capital Oagadougou, and only 179 of the 300 districts in the 




A national regulator Autorite National de Regulation des Telecommunications (ARTEL) 
was established in 1998, with the adoption of an Act by the government, and has been 
fully operational since March 2000.  It has since then granted two operating licenses and 




While Onatel’s monopoly ended recently, the mobile sector was liberalized in 2000 with 
two GSM licenses given to Celtel and Telecel.  The third mobile operator is Telmob, 
Onatel’s subsidiary that was established in 1996. 
Under a strategy for universal access supported by the World Bank, the government is 




In 1998 the government of Burkina Faso decided to privatize Onatel and adopted a draft 
legal and regulatory framework.  Privatization was originally scheduled for 2000.  In 
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November 2001 the government announced that it planned to sell the 51% stake of the 
company to foreign investors, 20% to the public, 6% to the employees and retain 23% 
ownership
76.  According to recent plans, the government intends to complete negotiations 
with an investment bank to manage the privatization of Onatel, with a view to sell the 




3.  Cape Verde 
Cabo Verde Telecom (CVT) is the sole supplier of telecommunications in Cape Verde 
and it reports to the Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport.  By 1999 Cape Verde was 
in its 3
rd stage of privatization with Portugal Telecom International owing 40% share of 
the company, 13.7% given to national private sector entities, 27.9% owned by the 
National Social Institute, 13.4% owned by the State of Cape Verde and the remaining 5% 
given to the employees
78. 
International calls were liberalized as of January 1
st 2006, despite the original monopoly 
provision until 2010.  The government of Cape Verde also announced that it will end 
CVT’s monopoly in fixed line as of January 1
st 2007.  In view of the liberalization of the 
sector, in late 2004 the government invited bids from Chinese and American 
telecommunications companies to operate services in Cape Verde in competition with 
CVT
79. 
The Regulatory Authority of the telecommunications sector is the Instituto de 
Communicacoes e Technologias de Informacao (ICTI) that was established in 2004 
(Resolution No 1/2004)
80. 
Cape Verde is the only country in ECOWAS that is listed in the “medium” category of 
the ITU Digital Access Index data in 2003.  In the fixed lines the penetration is 14 lines 
per 100 people (2005), which is the highest in the region, although it slightly decreased 
during the past year.  The waiting time for a new telephone was 0.7 years in 2000
81. 
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In the mobile sector there is also only one operator Telemovel, a subsidiary of CVT.  The 
cellular phones penetration level was 16.12 subscribers per 100 people in 2005, which is 
high by African standards.  
 
 
4.  Cote d’Ivoire 
General 
The telecommunications sector in Cote d’Ivoire has undergone restructuring and 
liberalization that began in 1991 and totally transformed the sector.  The state operator 
Cote d’Ivoire Telecom (CI-Telecom) was partially privatized in 1997 and its exclusivity 
period ended in December 2004.   
In the mobile sector three mobile operators were licensed in 1996, but one of them ceased 
operations in early 2004
82. Despite that, growth continued and there are now more than 
four times as many mobile subscribers than fixed lines.  
Fixed line teledensity in Cote d’Ivoire is 1.43% (2003), while mobile penetration is 
12.06% (2005).   
 
Fixed line 
The country’s telephone system is well-developed by African standards.  According to 
ITU in 2005 there were 1.43 main telephone lines per 100 inhabitants (there were 1.51 in 
1999). 
The national operator was privatized in 1997 with the sale of 51% stake of the company 
to France Telecom
83.   
Arobase Telecom was the second fixed line operator to be given a license in 2002.  The 
company has signed a twenty year concession with the government that allows it to build 
and exploit telecommunications network in fixed telephony.  The company has been 
building a fiber network, and has officially launched operations in October 2005
84.   
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Mobile 
Three mobile operators were granted licenses before the privatization of CI-TELCOM, 
Comstar and Telecel in 1995 and Ivoiris in 1996. This granting was not competitive, but 
it was given to the three main companies that have expressed interest. These networks 
were given a five year tax exemption and the freedom to set their own tariffs
85.  




The reform of the Ivorian telecommunications sector started in 1991 with the adoption of 
the restructuring scheme and the technical and financial audit of CI-TELCOM.  A new 
telecommunications code was passed in 1995 that established the legal framework to 
allow competition in the sector.  The law (no 95-526, 1995) reorganized the sector and 
differentiated the policy function (Ministry of Telecommunications), the regulatory 
activities (Telecommunications Agency and Telecommunications Council) and the 
operation of the networks (CI-TELCOM and mobile operators).  Competition was 
extended to all services except the telephone services between fixed points and the telex. 
The law established the Agence des Telecommunications de Cote d’Ivoire (ATCI) as the 
independent regulator and the Conseil de Telecommunications de Cote d’Ivoire (CTCI) 
as the highest telecommunications authority responsible for arbitration in case of 
problems between ATCI and the operators.  
Among ATCI’s responsibilities are to enforce the regulatory acts as far as 
telecommunications are concerned, define pricing under the monopoly regime, and 
deliver the operating authorization of the telecommunications services.  The Agency is 





The 1995 law opened the market to competition in mobile services, public payphones, 
data transmission and other value added services.  Three licenses were awarded to mobile 
                                                 
85 Laffont, J., and T. N’Guessan. 2002. “Telecommunications Reform in Cote d’Ivoire.”  
86 Paul Budde Communications. 2005. “Cote d’Ivoire – Telecoms Market Overview & Statistics.” 
87 Laffont, J., and T. N’Guessan. 2002. “Telecommunications Reform in Cote d’Ivoire.”    79
operators in 1995 and 1996 (Comstar, Telecel and Ivoiris).  Three licenses were also 
awarded for international telephony. 
In the fixed lines, CI-TELCOM’s exclusivity ended in 2004.  However, a de facto 
monopoly still exists until the National Assembly approves the new measures to 
liberalize the sector, which have been approved by the Council of Ministers since JAnary 
2005.  The new law seems unlikely to be passed before the end of 2006.  Under the new 
law the market will be fully liberalized and a new regulatory agency will be created
88.   
In 2002 Arobase Telecom, an Ivorian telecommunications company, has been given a 
license to build and operate a fiber network.   
 
Privatization 
Privatization began in 1991 under the pressure of the World Bank, with the technical and 
financial audit of CI-TELCOM.  In 1992, there was a legal and regulatory review of the 
sector that ended with the 1995 law.  The privatization entered into its final stage in 1996 
with the competitive invitation to tender.  In 1997 a twenty-year concession was granted 
for the fixed lines and 51% of the capital was given to France Cables et Radio (France 
Telecom), with the state retaining 47% and 2% given to the employees.  The company 





5.  The Gambia 
General 
Gambia Telecommunications Company (Gamtel), is the sole supplier of basic 
telecommunications services.  The company is 99% owned by the government and 1% by 
the Gambian National Insurance Company.  
With the implementation of a number of phased projects Gamtel managed to raise the 
number of fixed lines from 19,200 in 1995 to an estimated 42,600 in 2003, representing a 
teledensity of 2.8% (in 2005 main line penetration was 2.90%)
90.  The company currently 
has an Expansion Project according to which 230,000 fixed lines will be installed by 
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91.  However, waiting time for a new telephone line is still more than three years, 
and more than 65% of all main lines are in the capital city.  
In 2001 Gamtel launched the first GSM mobile system, and later that year a private 
company Africell was given a GSM license
92.  The two companies almost share the 
subscribers’ base, with Gamtel having around 160,000 and Africell around 130,000 
customers.  This year, a third mobile operator, West Coast Investment, has been granted a 
license.  Mobile tariffs have fallen because of competition and the mobile penetration 
reached 16.3% in 2005, which is high by African standards
93.  
Unlike most other African countries, Gambia’s small size makes investment in main line 
infrastructure a viable alternative to mobile expansion.  
 
Regulation 
The government has adopted a National Information and Communications Infrastructure 
Policy (NACIP) which sets out a regulatory framework.  In 2004 the Public Utility 
Regulatory Authority was established (PURA Act 2001) and is responsible for the 




Liberalization – Privatization 
With the adoption of the NACIP the government plans to create an environment more 
conducive to public and private ownership through to 2008.  Currently only the mobile 
sector is open to competition.  The operation of private telecenters is also permitted.  A 
new Telecoms Bill that will signal the end of the incumbent’s monopoly and open up the 
market is soon to be passed by the Gambian government.  The Bill will outline the 
guidelines for licensing, spectrum management, interconnection, and VoIP, and it will 
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6. Ghana 
Overview 
Reforms in the Ghanaian telecommunications sector began in 1994 when the government 
announced a five year plan for the restructuring of the industry.  An independent 
regulatory authority was established in 1996 and the same year the national operator, 
Ghana Telecom (GT), was partially privatized. A Second Network Operator (SNO) was 
introduced in 1997
96.   
The reforms, though, yielded mixed results.  The landline telephone penetration and the 
number of mobile subscribers increased considerably, but the network did not reach the 
levels the government hoped.  Additionally, the regulator is weak and relatively 
ineffective and GT’s strategic investor was removed in 2002. 
Ghana’s national telecom network, although it has improved in the past few years, suffers 
from a range of technical problems that result in congestion and poor quality of service.   
 
Fixed lines 
There are two national operators currently in Ghana: GT, the national incumbent and 
Westel, which was given a SNO license in 2002.  GT was partially privatized in 1996, 
when a 30% stake of the company was sold to G-Com (Telekom Malaysia).  In 2002 the 
contract with Telekom Malaysia was not renewed and Telenor of Norway came to 
replace Telekom Malaysia as the manager of GT
97.   
Legislation to regulate the two national operators was passed in 1996.  The licenses set 
network expansion and quality of service targets.  The two national operators were given 
a five-year exclusive duopoly over fixed and international voice telephony.  Both 
companies have failed to reach the required number of new main lines that were set in 
their contracts
98.  Although the number of main lines has increased from 105,500 in 1997 
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to 240,000 in early 2002, the growth rate was not as high as expected and in 2004 main 
line penetration was 1.47%
99. 
GT, despite its significant growth in the last years, is currently struggling with a debt to 
GSM providers.  The company and the sector’s regulator trade accusations on the causes 
of GT’s problems
100.  
In a recent development, WESTEL has become a fully-owned state entity, following a 
government’s acquisition through the Ghana National Petroleum Company.  The 
purchase has put an end to the legal action that Westel has been pursuing against the 
government and the National Communications Authority, alleging that their delay in 
making key decisions has caused the company severe financial damage.  The re-
nationalization of Westel, makes the government the sole shareholder of the nation’s two 
fixed line companies, having also bought back the stake of GT it has sold to Telekom 
Malaysia
101. 
In addition to the two national operators, Capital Telecom is licensed as a rural telephone 




The mobile sector in Ghana is fully liberalized and highly competitive.  The first mobile 
operator, Millicom Ghana (Mobitel), was launched in 1992, and between then and 1996 
other two companies were licensed to provide mobile telephony services.  These are 
Spacefon and Kasapa.  GT launched its own mobile service, OneTouch, in 2000.  Only 
GT and Spacefon offer nationwide coverage
103. 
By 2005, mobile lines represented 85% of the total telephone subscribers in Ghana and 
penetration was 8%.  
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The country offers potential for mobile operators, as fixed lines are concentrated around 
the capital area of Accra and the rural areas are neglected.  Although tariffs have declined 
due to competition, they still remain out of reach of much of the population.  
In 2004, the regulator proposed a new license fee scheme.  Previously none of the 
operators actually held a proper license and networks were launched based on written 




The government stated its telecommunications objectives in the Accelerated 
Development Program (ADP) for 1994-2000.  The ADP called for competition in the 
sector with a second network operator (SNO), expansion on mobile networks, no 
restriction on private networks and the establishment of an independent regulatory body 
to regulate the sector under the policy of the Ministry of Communications.
105 
The National Communications Authority (NCA) was established by Parliamentary Act in 
1996.  The Act gave NCA considerable authorities, including responsibilities for: 
granting licenses, allocating frequencies, providing tariff rules and guidelines, and 
providing advice on policy for the sector to the Minister.  NCA reports to the Ministry of 
Transport and Communications and is financially autonomous
106.  The Authority 
generates funds by collecting 1% of fixed line and mobile operators’ turnover.  NCA is 
collecting a further 1% of operators’ turnover for Ghana Investment Fund to promote 
rural telephony
107.  
The Act failed to safeguard the independence of NCA from political intervention.  All 
members of its Board of Directors are appointed by the President and could be removed 
by the President at any time “for stated reasons”. 
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After its establishment, the NCA operated for four years without a board of directors.  
After a new government assumed office, the new minister of communications was 
appointed as a temporary board chairman for one year
108.   
The NCA places a price cap on the fixed line operators and allows mobile operators to fix 
their own tariffs.  Thus, while mobile operators do not pay anything to GT for calls 
originating from mobile to fixed line, GT has to share with mobile operators the amount 
realized from calls originating from its end to mobile phones
109.  
Besides the lack of independence, NCA is reported to have other weaknesses such as lack 
of staff and expertise to meet its regulatory mandate.  Moreover, the regulator operates 
with more than usual information asymmetry and it does not have even the most minimal 
information it needs to regulate.  In the absence of effective regulation major disputes 
have arisen over interconnection.  NCA has been unable to resolve major disputes 




Reforms were introduced gradually in the Ghanaian telecommunications sector, 
beginning in 1992 with the allowance of cellular entry.  Initially, mobile entry was 
allowed without charge and with minimum regulation.  Multiple licenses were awarded 
in 1992, but only one company, Mobitel, began operations in 1992-93.  Two more 
operators were given licenses until 1996.  All operators developed interconnection 
agreements with GT.  The mobile operators were allowed to enter the market using 
authorizations rather than formal licenses with clearly defined service obligations
111.   
A license for a SNO was awarded in 1997 to Western Telesystems, a consortium led by a 
US company.  The company operated under an exclusive duopoly regime until 2002.  
Westel started offering services in 1999, due to interconnection issues and limited 
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investment.  It has not yet started providing cellular services, mainly due to problems of 
frequency allocation.  The company also failed to reach the required 50,000 new phone 
lines, as by end-2003 it only provided 3,000 lines, and NCA had to impose a penalty
112.  
Westel was unable to pay the full amount and has been virtually removed from 
competition, as the company’s subscribers base has not increased.  
 
Privatization 
With plans for privatization, the national operator was incorporated in 1995 as a public 
limited liability company and separated from postal services.  After a bidding process, 
30% of GT’s stake was sold to G-Com Ltd (Telekom Malaysia).  The government 
retained the remaining 70% of the company.  Telekom Malaysia also had the 
management of the company and held the majority on the board of directors
113.   
Following the expiry of the duopoly in 2002, the government announced changes in the 
board structure of GT with the objective of divesting further and inviting more foreign 
investment.  In the same time, the management contract of Telekom Malaysia expired 
and the government refused to renew it, despite the 2001 agreement that Telekom 
Malaysia would be allowed to increase its share by 15%
114.  The government stated that 
the company has failed to install the number of additional lines stipulated by the contract 
arrangements. 
Later the same year, the government invited foreign participation to acquire part of the 
retaining 70% stake of GT.  Discussions were entered into with Telenor ASA, but the 
company did not wish to buy part of GT, and was solely interested in the management.  A 
management service agreement was signed in 2003
115.   
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In January 2005 the government announced its aim to sell a 51% stake in GT to a 
strategic Investor.  In the same year, the government bought back the 30% shareholding 
in GT that it has sold to Telekom Malaysia
116.  
7.  Guinea 
The main telecommunications company in Guinea, Societe des Telecommunications de 
Guinee (Sotelgui) was created in 1993 and privatized in 1995.  Telekom Malaysia bought 
a 60% stake and the government retained the remaining 40%. In the framework of this 
cooperation Telekom Malaysia was expected to fulfill several expectations, mainly 
improving the whole industry and passing the technical know-how
117.  
However, in early 2005, Telekom Malaysia announced that it was divesting from Guinea, 
having failed to increase the number of Sotelgui’s subscribers (fixed and mobile) to 
500,000.  The company currently has only 161,600 fixed lines and its mobile arm is 
highly inefficient
118.   
In 2004, main line penetration was only 0.34%. 
In the mobile sector, up to mid-2005 there were three operators, Sotelgui’s mobile 
company and private operators (Telecel and Spacetel).  In 2005 a fourth GSM license 
was awarded to the Senegalese Sonatel.  Guinea’s mobile sector, although it has grown in 
the last years, is not in a good condition, and further development of the industry is 
constrained by a lack of adequate infrastructure.  In 2005, there were only 2.36 
subscribers per 100 people.  Sotelgui’s mobile branch has been unable to provide even 
the basic services and the presence of the other companies has done little to improve the 
situation.  One example of Sotelgui’s inefficiency is the unavailability of SIM cards, the 
distribution of which is in its hands
119.  SIM cards are currently available on the black 
market at highly inflated prices of around US$180.  
The regulatory authority of the telecommunications sector is Direction Nationale des 
Postes et Telecommunications that was established in 1992.  The body reports to the 
Ministry and is not autonomous in its decision making
120.  
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8.  Guinea-Bissau 
The telecommunications sector in Guinea-Bissau is dominated by Guine-Telecom.  The 
majority stake (51%) of the company is owned by Portugal Telecom.  In 2004 Portugal 
Telecom signed a new ten year concession, following the unilateral revocation of a 20-
year concession signed in 1989.  Under the new contract Portugal Telecom’s stake in GT 
will fall to 40%
121.  
In the mobile sector, Guine Tel was established by the government in 2003 and will now 
form part of GT.  Portugal Telecom’s stake in the mobile arm of GT is 55%.  Since 
December 2003, Spacetel Guinee-Bissau, a mobile company, has been operating in the 
country
122. 
In 2003, there were only 0.82 main telephone lines per 100 inhabitants.  The number of 
mobile phone subscribers has increased considerably from 3.19 per 100 inhabitants in 
2004 to 5.01 in 2005.  
In 1999 the government passed a new law for the reform of the sector.  Under this law an 
independent regulatory body (the Guinea-Bissau Telecommunications Institute) would be 
established and competition would be allowed in the sector
123.  As a result, Institut des 







Liberia’s telecommunications infrastructure has experienced extensive destruction during 
the 13-year war.  Before the war, Liberia Telecommunications Corporation (LTC), the 
country’s only public company providing fixed-line telephone services, served 10,000 
subscribers on fixed-line and wireless loop systems.  Currently, LTC has approximately 
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7,000 fixed lines installed and 2,000 wireless system subscribers.  In addition, most of the 
fixed-lines are not even functional
125.  Fixed line penetration is 0.21% (2003). 
LTC has been straggling with problems in the past years.  Since the beginning of 2005 
the company has halted operations and in May 2006 the government announced that it 
will close it down due to its inability to generate revenues
126. 
The mobile sector is dominated by Lone Star Communications, the incumbent mobile 
service, which launched its services in 2001.  Lone Star is owned 69% by Investcom 
Holding and 40% by local shareholders.  The company was handed a virtual monopoly 
by the previous regime without a provision requiring it to share its mobile 
infrastructure
127.  Currently there are four licensed GSM companies in Liberia: Lonestar, 
Comium Liberia, Atlantic Wirelss Liberia/LiberCell, and Cellcom telecommunications.  
The increased private sector participation has alleviated the communications gap created 
by LTC’s ineffectiveness
128.  Mobile penetration has increased significantly in the last 
years from 1.40% in 2003 to 4.87% in 2005.  
 
Regulation 
The Ministry of Post and Telecommunications (MP&T) is the body responsible for the 
policy formulation and regulatory oversight of the sector.  The Chairman of the 
Transitional Government has established a special Presidential Telecommunications 
Committee to investigate new licenses issued by the Ministry. 
Regulatory credibility in the sector is very low owing to the perceived lack of capacity in 
the Ministry, the absence of an independent regulator and the lack of clarity of the 
parallel decision making structure
129.  
The Liberian government together with the World Bank has proposed a comprehensive 
National Telecommunications Policy for Liberia.  According to it, the sector will be 
liberalized, the incumbent operator will be privatized, private operators will be allowed to 
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enter the market and an independent Regulatory Authority (Liberian Telecommunications 
Authority – LTA) will be established
130.  
In September 2005, the Liberian Government has passed a law for the creation of LTA, 
but there are disputes within the country concerning a violation by the bill of the Liberian 





In early 2005 the Board of Directors of LTC passed a resolution confirming the Universal 
Telephone Exchange (UTE) as the winner of the bid for revitalization, modernization ad 
improvement of LTC.  However, the head of the transitional government stepped on the 
confirmation and refused to award the contract to UTE, which has been accused of 




10.  Mali 
The Ministry of Telecommunications is the government body responsible for the 
telecommunications sector.  In 1999 the Telecommunications Regulatory Committee 
(CRT) has been created as the autonomous body responsible for ensuring the application 
of regulations
133.  The Societe de Telecommunications de Mali (Sotelma) is the state 
telecommunications company.   
Under the auspices of the IMF the sector is gradually being liberalized.  In 2001 laws 
were passed to open the market to competition and to facilitate the sale of Sotelma.  The 
company generated little interest and according to a revised timetable discussed with the 
World Bank the sale was scheduled to be completed in July 2006
134.  However, there was 
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a further delay in the sale that is now not expected to be completed until the end of 
2006
135.  
Mali’s first mobile operator, Sotelma’s mobile subsidiary Malitel, was established in 
1999.  A second fixed line and mobile operator, Groupe France Telecom’s Ikatel, entered 
the market in 2002.  Ikatel is the market leader with 520,000 subscribers, compared to 
187,000 of Malitel’s.  The number of cellular subscribers has grown significantly in the 
last years and, as elsewhere in Africa, there are now many more Malaysians with mobile 
phones than fixed lines
136.  According to ITU statistics, in 2005 there were 7.66 mobile 
subscribers and 0.66 fixed lines per 100 inhabitants.  
 
 
11.  Niger 
Societe Nigerienne des Telecommunications (Sonitel) is the national operator.  In 
November 2001 a majority stake in the company was sold to Dataport.  The company 
came under public scrutiny in 2004 for having failed to carry out the expansion that had 
been promised at the time of the privatization.  The number of telephone lines has 
remained almost unchanged since 1998, at just 0.19 lines per 100 inhabitants in 2004, 
compared with 0.18 in 1999
137.  
Mobile phone penetration is also very low, at an estimated 1.63 subscribers per 100 
inhabitants in 2005.  The mobile operators are SahelCom, a subsidiary of Sonitel, Telecel 
Niger that began operations in 2001, and Celtel Niger that started its activities in 2004. 
According to ITU, the regulatory authority of Niger’s telecommmunications sector is 
Autorite de Regulation Multisectorielle (ARM). 
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12.  Nigeria 
General 
The Nigerian telecommunications industry has undergone a series of reforms during the 
last years.  An independent regulator was established in 1992, and has since then given a 
number of licenses in fixed telephony, mobile and long distance operations.  Despite the 
initial plans for its privatization, the national operator (Nitel) has not yet been sold.  
The ongoing liberalization has led to a multi-operator environment, the gradual end of 
monopolies, increased investment in the sector and improved quality.  The expansion of 
the network was also significant, especially in the mobile sector.  Nevertheless, Nigeria’s 




The national carrier Nigerian Telecommunications (Nitel) has a derelict public network 
that is incapable of meeting demand.  The company has blamed its poor performance on 
outstanding customer debt.  In 2003 Nitel appointed a private company, Pentascope, as its 
new manager for the next three years, to lead up to its sale.  
A second national operator (SNO), Globacom Ltd., was given a license in 2002.  To 
encourage competition at all levels of the market, the SNO license allows the company to 
operate a national carrier, a GSM network, a Fixed Wireless Access (FWA) network and 
an international gateway.  
In May 2002 the sector’s regulator also awarded 22 licenses to private companies to 
operate FWA services.  
Fixed line teledensity was 0.93% in 2005, still below the government’s target of 1%.  The 
majority of the lines are concentrated in a few major cities, and large areas of the country, 
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The mobile sector of Nigeria has seen a remarkable growth in the last years.  By 2005, 
14.14% of the country population had access to mobile phone, compared with just 0.03% 
in 2000.  Now the country has the second largest mobile market in Africa, after South 
Africa, but its services remain quite expensive (the operators are severely criticized for 
their high tariffs).  In addition, capacity problems have forced operators to suspend new 
subscriptions temporarily, while investing in infrastructure
139. 
There are four operators currently in the market: Mobile Telephone Networks (MTN) 
Nigeria and Econet Nigeria International (now V Mobile) that began operations in 2001, 
M-Tel (Nitel’s mobile subsidiary) that was launched in 2002, and Globacom, which 
entered the market in 2003.  
 
Regulation 
Nigeria’s telecommunication’s industry was essentially restructured in 1992 with the 
promulgation of a communications decree, which led to the establishment of the Nigerian 
Communications Commission (NCC), the sector’s regulator.  The Ministry of 
Communications has the task of formulating the telecommunications policy. 
In 2000 the revised National Telecommunications Policy (NTP) was published, having as 
basic objective the modernization and rapid expansion of the telecom network.  The NTP 
led the foundations for the opening of the communications market and set the target of 
achieving 1% teledensity.  
In 2003 a new Telecommunications Act that repeals the Act of 1992 came into law.  The 
Act ensures the reform of NCC, with a view of giving it full autonomy, and establishes a 
Frequency Management Board
140.  
Among the NCC’s regulations are a set of interconnection guidelines known as 
Interconnection Rules.  The two main elements of the rules are that: i) every operator 
must allow other operators full interconnection to its network, and ii) interconnection 
payments should be based on the actual cost and applied on a non-discriminatory 
manner
141.  Despite the establishment of the guidelines there are cited problems with 
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interconnection in Nigeria.  For example, many customers carry multiple phones, one 
from each operator, in order to be able to communicate with all networks.  Recently there 
was an interconnection dispute between mobile operators, MTN and Econet, and the 
incumbent fixed line operator over unpaid revenues and lack of bandwidth.  Since, there 
are only guidelines, and no firm regulations, NCC lacks the enforceability to arbitrate 
interconnection dispute and negotiations.  As a result, interconnection decisions stay with 
the operators, unfairly benefiting the larger ones at the expense of smaller Private 
Telecom Operators (PTOs)
142.  Moreover, there is an ongoing dissatisfaction among users 
concerning interconnection charges and NCC has drew a downward prediction on 
interconnection rates, which is regarded as equitable by end users and the business 
community.  
As far as tariffs are concerned, NCC has established a set of tariff guidelines.  According 
to them service tariffs must be cost based and allow the operator to derive sufficient 
revenues, and cross subsidization is prohibited, except in the case of promoting universal 
access
143.  
NCC has also drawn a set of ‘Enforcement Regulations” that empower subscribers to 
petition in writing any operator whose services are less than satisfactory
144.  
Since its establishment the NCC has adopted a policy of full liberalization, issuing a large 
number of licenses to a SNO, four mobile operators, two long distance operators and over 
200 value added-services companies
145.  The regulator used licensing as a tool to meet 
market demand.  Although successful to some extent, the end result is a highly 
fragmented market which is difficult to regulate
146.  Moreover, many of the companies 
that have received a license from NCC never began operations
147.   
The five years exclusivity period given to mobile operators ended in February 2006.  In 
order to further open up the market NCC introduced a unified licensing scheme, which 
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allows existing fixed wireless and mobile licenses to provide both services, subject only 
to regional limitations.  Under this scheme licenses are not segmented in terms of fixed or 
mobile services, but once spectrum is allocated, licensees are able to offer voice, data or 
multimedia services as they see fit.  The first batch of unified licenses was given to four 
operators in May 2006.  The four companies were the winners amongst a vast number of 
applications that will continue to go through licensing procedures.  The companies paid 
N260 million (US$1.8 million) for each license for an initial period of ten years
148.   
 
Liberalization 
A policy to liberalize the telecommunications sector was announced in 1991, and the 
government has been implementing this since then, with the entry of numerous players in 
all segments of the market
149. 
Liberalization began with the opening up of the mobile market.  In 1998 and 1999 six 
licenses were given to companies to operate nationwide GSM-900 services and seven 
more licenses were given in the 1800 frequency band.  However, in September 1999 the 
government unexpectedly decided to issue only four licenses and maintain exclusivity for 
the next years
150.   
In 2002 the fixed telephony market opened up for competition. A Second National 
Operator (Globacom Ltd) was awarded a license in September 2002.  The license is valid 
for twenty years and also includes mobiles services, FWA network, and an international 
gateway. 
In May 2002, NCC granted licenses to 22 private companies to operate Fixed Wireless 
Access (FWA) services.  In addition, two companies won licenses in 2002 to operate 
national long-distance communications services, and numerous companies have secured 
licenses to provide value-added services, community and rural telephony and regional 
telecom services
151.  
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Privatization 
Nitel’s privatization, although planned for since 1998, has still not materialized.  The 
Nigerian government first announced plans to privatize Nitel in 1998.  The sale finally 
occurred in 2001, when Investor International London Limited (IILL) signed an 
agreement to buy a majority 51% stake of Nitel.  In March 2002 Nigeria’s ambitious 
privatization program received a major setback when the planned sale collapsed, since 
IILL failed to come up with the full payment
152. 
In 2003 Nitel entered into a three year management contract with Pentascope 
International, but the contract was terminated early in February 2005, due to alleged 
incompetence and inability of the company to meet rollout and performance targets
153. 
In 2005, the Bureau of Public Enterprises (BPE) put forward an alternative privatization 
plan to sell 20% stake of the company through a domestic IPO and 51% stake to a 
strategic foreign investor.  In mid-2005 BPE announced that it has short-listed six 
organizations that are interested in buying Nitel’s majority stake
154.  Problems seemed to 
appear with the exclusion of some of the company’s assets (the Trans-Atlantic SAT-3 
cable) after the initiation of the biding process.  The matter was taken to court after a 
company worker filed a suit
155.  In December 2005, the government rejected an offer of 
US$256 million made by Orascom.
156 
In May 2006 BPE announced that it had adopted a new strategy for the privatization of 
NITEL, and will now seek a negotiated sale rather that risk a third failed auction process.  
BPE also said that it wished to avoid the auction process since it would take more time, 
during which the company would continue to lose value.  The company’s revenues 
halved over the past three years and its mobile unit lost more than half of its market 
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13.  Senegal 
General 
According to the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) Senegal has one of the 
most efficient telecommunications networks in West Africa.  The sector began its reform 
in 1985, with the unbundling of the posts and telecoms monopoly and the creation of 
Sonatel.  However, it wasn’t until 1997 that real liberalization began with the partial 
privatization of the national operator.  The incumbent’s monopoly officially ended in 
2004.  Mobile services were introduced in 1996 and competition began in that sector in 
1999
158.  
In the fixed lines, the sole operator is Sonatel, partially owned by France Telecom, that 
enjoyed a monopoly up to 2004.  A second national operator license for fixed lines, 
mobile, and international calls is soon to be tendered out
159.  Although, Senegal has one 
of the highest penetration levels in the ECOWAS region with an estimated fixed line 
teledensity of 2.29% in 2005, the growth rate has decreased in recent years.  Moreover, 
France Telecom has failed to reach the target specified in its contract of connecting 1,000 
villages each year
160.  A major program to expand telephone coverage to rural areas is 
under way.  
In the mobile sector, there is controlled competition with the presence of two companies, 
Alizee (subsidiary of Sonatel), and Sentel.  Sentel’s license was withdrawn in 2000 after 
the new government discovered that the price paid for the license was to low.  After 
period of unsettlement, and threats by the government that the license would be revoked, 
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the company continued operations
161.  Mobile penetration is high by African standards, 
and has increased considerably in the last year from 10.85% in 2004 to 14.84% in 2005.   
 
Liberalization 
The reform of the sector began officially in 1995 with the adoption of a law that laid the 
ground for the liberalization and the privatization process.  The monopoly right was taken 
from Sonatel, and a framework was set for organizing competition in the sector.  The act 
established three levels of operations: free competition in value-added services, organized 
competition in the cellular phone sector, and monopoly in fixed lines
162.  
The Ministry of commerce was in charge of the liberalization process of the mobile 
sector.  Sonatel created Alizee, its cellular department, in 1996 just before its 
privatization.  A second license was given to Sentel in 1998 and the company began 
operations in 1999.  Sonatel’s mobile company retains a monopoly on international calls 
until 2006
163. 
In December 2001 the government updated the telecommunications law, with the aim to 
further liberalize the sector.  The new Act liberalized the market for a number of services 
and removed some monopoly benefits from Sonatel.  
The main element of the law was the creation of an independent regulatory agency, 
Agence de Regulation des Telecommunications (ART).  It also paved the way for the 
opening of rural telephony to private investment as a means of achieving universal 
service
164.  
Sonatel’s monopoly in fixed lines officially ended in 2004 and a second company is 
currently expected to enter the market. 
 
Regulatory authority 
Agence de Regulation des Telecommunications (ART), the sector regulator, was created 
by law in December 2001 and established in 2002.  The agency took on several of the 
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functions of the Ministry of Communications, which was dissolved in May 2001
165.  It is 
a public institution with financial autonomy, responsible for licensing, spectrum 
management, tariff approval, interconnection, and renegotiation of licenses and contracts.  
As a young agency, ART still needs to make progress in respect to independency and 
transparency.  
The creation of ART, although ready on paper for a long time, has been resisted.  The 




Sonatel’s privatization took place in 1997 in three steps: i) sale of a strategic bloc of 33% 
to France Telecom, ii) sale of 10% of the company to employees, iii) public sale of shares 
(18%).  Neither the government, not the strategic partner controlled the administrative 
board
167.  The strategic partner had a seven-year concession with exclusive rights that 
ended in 2004.  In 1999 a capital restructuring increased France Telecom’s stake to 42%, 
reducing the government’s share to 30%
168. 
The most important event that took place after the liberalization and privatization 
processes was the withdrawal of Sentel’s license by the Senegalese Government in 
October 2000, on the ground that the price paid for the license, as well as the annual fee 
were very low.  The withdrawal of the license provoked criticism from the French and 
US governments, and since then there have been reports of plans to renegotiate the 
license
169.   
Since privatization Sonatel has cut its prices and improved the quality of service.   
However, the company failed to reach the expansion targets set at the year of 
privatization, which were to connect 1,000 villages each year.  Seven years later fewer 
than 1,000 villages in total have been connected
170.  
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14.  Sierra Leone 
General 
There is only one fixed-line network operator in Sierra Leone, Sierratel, the national 
incumbent that is 100% owned by the government.  During the war the company lost 
most of its equipment and has managed to restore services only to the major provincial 
centers
171.  The main lines penetration remains very low at 0.48 lines per 100 inhabitants 
(2003). 
Currently there are five licensed mobile operators in Sierra Leone, competing in one of 
the most underdeveloped wireless markets.  The market leaders are Celtel and Millicom, 
and the other three are Commium, Lintel and Datatel
172.  There are now around 100,000 
mobile customers in the country, with a penetration of 2.28 subscribers per 100 
inhabitants (2004).  However, the mobile industry faces a number of problems.  One of 
the issues has to do with the lack of rural coverage and another problem is the fact that 




The sector is regulated by the Ministry of Transport and Communications with the 
assistance of the incumbent operator.  The government is on the first stage of a 
Telecommunications reform.  The goal is to establish an independent regulator and 
liberalize the sector.  It is expected that the regulator will take over the responsibilities of 
the Ministry and Sierratel and will be independent from the government
174.  
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15.  Togo 
General 
The main operator of the sector is Togo Telecom that belongs to the State.  The company 
managed to raise its lines from 21,700 in 1995 to 60,600 in 2003, but the penetration is 
still low at 1.2 fixed lines per 100 inhabitants.  
In the mobile sector, Togocel, a subsidiary of Togo Telecom was established in 1997.  A 
second license was issued in 1999 to Telecel Holding International, which was later 
bought by Orascom.  The mobile market reached an estimated penetration of 11.23 




An independent regulator, Autorite de Reglementation des Secteurs de Postes et 
Telecommunications (ART&P), was established by law in 1998 and has been operational 
since 1999.  Since then, the agency has established interconnection and tariff policies and 




Togo’s telecommunications sector is undergoing serious reforms in the last years.  The 
plans were to liberalize the sector and privatize Togo Telecom.  As far as liberalization is 
concerned, the monopoly of Togo telecom was partially broken with the introduction of 
competition in the mobile sector.  The government also awarded a rural 
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Privatization 
In 2001, a consultant was appointed to advise the Government and oversee the 
privatization of Togo Telecom.  At first the transaction was scheduled to be completed in 
December 2003, but now this is not expected to happen until 2006 at the earliest
178. 
Overall Togo’s reform, although not finished yet, was rated as one of the most successful 
in a recent ECOWAS review, resulting in an increase in the penetration and the sector 
contribution to GDP, and a decline in the tariff level.  On the other hand, the service 
coverage objective for non-urban areas has not yet been achieved. 
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Comparative Table ECOWAS Region 
















Benin Yes  2002  No  Monopoly
  Competition 2.02 
Burkina 
Faso  Yes 1998  No  Monopoly
2 Competition  5.06 
Cape 
Verde  Yes 2004  Yes  Monopoly  Competition  30.20 
Cote 
d’Ivoire  Yes 1995  Yes  Partial 
Competition  Competition  9.13 
Gambia Yes  2004 No Monopoly  Partial 19.21 
Ghana Yes  1997
3 Yes  Partial 
Competition  Competition  9.39 
Guinea Yes
4 1992  Yes  Partial 
Competition  Competition  1.78 
Guinea-
Bissau  Yes 1999  Yes  Monopoly Partial 
Competition  0.92 
Liberia No  n/a No  Partial 
Competition
 5  Competition  0.28 
Mali Yes  1999  No  Partial 
Competition 
Partial 
Competition  8.33 
Niger Yes  n/a  Yes  Monopoly  Competition  1.39 
Nigeria Yes  1992  No  Competition  Partial 
Competition  15.07 
Senegal Yes  n/a Yes  Competition  Competition  17.13 
Sierra 
Leone  No n/a  No Monopoly
6 Competition  1.84 




Competition  5.61 
Source: Adopted from ITU    103
1.  Combined fixed and mobile penetration in 2005.  In countries in Italics the number 
corresponds to previous years. 
2.  Onatel’s monopoly ended recently, no new operators have entered the market. 
3.  The law establishing the authority was passed in 1996 
4.   The authority is not autonomous in its decision making 
5.  There is full competition in international long distance 
6.  There is partial competition in international long distance 
7.  There is a monopoly in domestic long distance 
 
 














Note: The total numbers correspond to all ECOWAS countries except Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and Mali. 
Source: ITU. 2005. “GSM Mobile Networks in West Africa. Mission Report.” Dakar. 
 
 